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With this proposal, the Wuppertal Institute aims to present a comprehensive vision for a 
future climate regime that would be both environmentally eff ective and equitable. The new 
treaty needs to be robust enough to drive very ambitious emission reductions globally, but 
at the same time the eff ort that is necessary to achieve these reductions must be distrib-
uted equitably according to the Convention’s core principle of common but diff erentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities.
Aimed to inform the negotiations, the aim of this proposal is therefore not to show how 
the climate challenge can be “solved”, but how the international agreement to be reached 
in Copenhagen could be designed in a way to make solving the climate challenge pos-
sible. The parameters of the negotiations were set at the climate conference in Montreal in 
2005, where negotiations on post-2012 emission targets for industrialised countries were 
started, and in the Bali Action Plan (BAP) agreed at the climate conference in Bali in 2007. 
The BAP calls for addressing four main “building blocks”: mitigation, adaptation, fi nancing, 
and technology co-operation. The proposal is structured along the negotiation mandates 
from Montreal and Bali. Due to this starting point and structure the proposal might in places 
seem to be overly reliant on government regulation and technological changes. In fact, pre-
venting dangerous climate change will very likely also require more fundamental changes 
to the current patterns of production and consumption, particularly by the wealthy among 
the world‘s population. However, integrating such more fundamental concerns was not 
possible within the amount of time available to the project team.
The proposal is based on several background papers that were elaborated on the various 
building blocks of the BAP. These background papers contain the main body of analysis and 
weighing the advantages and disadvantages of design options for the post-2012 regime. 
The “Wuppertal Proposal” is the synthesis of the fi ndings in the background papers. As such, 
it does not go deeply into the analysis itself but mainly focuses on laying out and integrat-
ing the conclusions from the background papers. 
The proposal builds on the extensive work the Wuppertal Institute has done on interna-
tional climate policy since it was founded almost 20 years ago. In this work, the Wuppertal 
Institute has always tried to step out of its German and European perspective and take on 
board the views from other parts of the world. The most prominent of these projects has 
been the South-North Dialogue on Equity in the Greenhouse, which brought together part-
ners from 12 countries from all around the world to discuss an equitable framework for 
international climate policy.
Preface
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While the Copenhagen project was conducted solely at the Wuppertal Institute, here 
as well we have tried to incorporate diff erent perspectives by organising a side event 
at the Susidiary Body meeting in June 2009 to discuss a fi rst draft and submitting the 
same draft to international experts for written review. We gratefully acknowledge the very 
helpful comments made by Chandra Bushan (Centre for Science and Enviroment, India), 
Niklas Höhne (Ecofys, Germany), Pan Jiahua (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), Emilio 
Lèbre La Rovere (Centro Clima at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), and Jake 
Schmidt (Natural Resources Defense Council, USA). Further very helpful comments were 
made by reviewers from inside the Wuppertal Institute: Raimund Bleischwitz, Rainer Lucas 
and Oscar Reutter. 
We also gratefully acknowledge the fi nancial support provided by the Friends of the 
Wuppertal Institute (Vereinigung der Freunde des Wuppertal Instituts e.V.), which made 
this project possible.
That said, full responsibility for the contents of this proposal lies with the authors and any 
bias, mistakes or omissions are our own.
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Overview: Shared Vision and Key Elements 
for the Copenhagen Deal
To prevent dangerous climate change, global temperature increase should be limited to 
below 2°C. To safeguard a high probability of meeting this target, global greenhouse gas 
emissions should peak until 2015 at the latest and be reduced to at least 80% below 1990 
levels by 2050 and more thereafter. Against current projections for the global population 
in 2050 this translates to average global per capita emissions of at maximum 1 t. As no 
group of persons can claim a right to occupy signifi cantly more environmental space than 
other persons, all countries should set themselves the long-term goal to bring their per 
capita emissions to this level by 2050 (see chapter 1).
In addition, the “negative” vision of emission reductions should be complemented by a posi-
tive vision of the direction society wants to travel in. One key element of this vision should 
be: Sustainable energy services for all. A global reduction of 80% will probably only be pos-
sible if emissions from use of fossil fuels are brought close to zero, to account for the smaller 
opportunities to reduce biogenic emissions. The Copenhagen agreement should there-
fore also include global targets for the reduction of energy consumption and the growth 
of renewable energy sources. The purpose of these targets would be to serve as strategic 
guidelines for the elaboration and implementation of mitigation actions by industrialised 
and developing countries. Although existing global energy scenarios have ambitious tar-
gets, none of them can achieve a reduction of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 
80% below 1990 levels by 2050. Given the need for highly ambitious reductions of global 
emissions until 2050, much greater eff orts are necessary than scheduled in the existing world 
energy scenarios. The pathways to allow such an increase in renewable energy technologies 
and decrease of energy intensity need to be further elaborated. Thus, the following fi gures 
are for the time being indicative illustrations and assumptions of the scale of transformation 
on a global scale that would be needed to meet the 2°C target (see chapter 2):
3 Aim to improve global average energy intensity by at least 3.5% per year until 2050. 
3 Aim to reduce global per capita fi nal energy demand by 5% in 2020, by 10% in 2030 
and by 20 to 30% in 2050. 
3 A long-term goal should be set to obtain the complete global primary energy supply 
from renewable sources. The following mid-term assumptions could help to promote 
this development:
– Share of renewable energy in primary energy supply (currently around 14%) should 
increase at least to 25% by 2020 and at least 40% by 2030. 
– The share of renewable energy in heat and power supply should increase close to 
40% in 2020 and 55% in 2030. Currently, the share of renewable energy in heat sup-
ply is around 25% and in electrical power supply around 19%.  
– Global installed electricity generation capacity from renewable energy is currently 
around 1,200 GW and should increase to at least 3,000 GW by 2020 and 6,000 GW 
by 2030 
3 Global public funding for research, development and demonstration for mitigation 
and adaptation should be signifi cantly increased to at least €15 billion/year by 2015 
and to at least €20 billion/year by 2020 (currently assumed at €4–7 billion/a). 
3 To realise the component of achieving sustainable energy services for all, the goal 
should be set to secure access to modern energy services for everyone by 2025.
Overview         Sha ed Vision an  Key Elements 
7 To w a r d s  a n  E f f e c t i v e  a n d  E q u i t a b l e  C l i m a t e  C h a n g e  A g r e e m e n t  WUPPERTAL INSTITUTE
As regards the feasibility of meeting such targets, the growth of renewable energy use in 
Germany is one example where developments have constantly outperformed even opti-
mistic assumptions. But it does indeed seem likely that the potential of technology to 
achieve the necessary reductions will be insuffi  cient and will therefore have to be accom-
panied by more fundamental changes in the patterns of production and consumption, 
particularly by the wealthy among the world‘s population.
Due to their historical responsibility and much higher capability, industrialised countries 
need to take the lead and assume responsibility for 3/4 to 4/5 of the global mitigation 
eff ort required by 2020 (see chapters 3 and 4). They should therefore assume a two-fold 
obligation:
3 Ambitious Kyoto-style national emission reduction targets of in aggregate at least 
40% below 1990 levels by 2020. To start convergence of per capita emissions, at least 
30% should be achieved through domestic action.
3 A legally binding obligation to support Southern countries in mitigating their emis-
sions by a specifi c amount to be laid down in the Copenhagen agreement. If the indus-
trialised countries assume responsibility for 4/5 of the global mitigation eff ort required 
by 2020, this amount would roughly be equivalent to a further 20 % of their own 1990 
emissions, in addition to the Kyoto-style target of at least 40% below 1990 levels.
In addition, industrialised countries should commit to developing Commitment 
Achievement Plans (CAPs) that lay out which measures they plan to take to fulfi ll their 
two-fold obligation. These plans should be subject to domestic and international review.
For developing countries, the climate regime should create a strategic global investment 
programme to enable them to shift to a low-emission development path (see chapters 3 
and 5). This programme should be based on two pillars
3 Guaranteed funding from industrialised countries through the above obligation;
3 Country-driven low-carbon development strategies (LCDS) addressing all key sectors. 
These strategies should clearly identify which measures can be taken to reduce emis-
sions and where support from industrialised countries is needed to implement these 
measures.
In addition to mitigation, all countries should commit to develop national adaptation 
plans, including industrialised countries. Southern countries are entitled to receive appro-
priate fi nancial support and capacity building (see chapter 6). 
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Climate fi nance is not about about aid, with donors and recipients (see chapter 7). Instead, 
it is about taking joint responsibility for a common problem, with each side being account-
able to the other and contributing according to their common but diff erentiated respon-
sibilities and respective capabilities.
Where possible, fi nancial support should be provided on a country basis to support 
comprehensive programmes, rather than on an activity basis. The international sale of 
assigned amount units (AAUs) is the “fi rst-best” solution to generate the necessary fi nan-
cial resources. The proportion of the AAUs to be set aside would depend on the estimated 
revenue needed and the expected carbon price. To take into account countries’ varying 
responsibility and capability, the quantity of AAUs to be withheld from each industrialised 
country could vary based on its comparative responsibility and capability. Further rev-
enue should be sourced from international aviation and shipping. 
To prevent cherry-picking by donors, maximise comprehensiveness and allow to exploit 
synergies, it seems recommendable to develop a consolidated fi nancial mechanism at 
UNFCCC level. At the same time, care should be taken not to create an unwieldy and 
potentially undemocratic super-bureaucracy under the UNFCCC. The mechanism should 
therefore follow a hybrid centralised-decentralised model:
3 Centralised: A global climate fund would collect and co-ordinate all fi nancial fl ows 
from industrialised countries, review the mitigation and adaptation plans (e.g., LCDS) 
proposed by developing countries and on this basis disburse funding.
3 Decentralised: Specifi c funding decisions should to a large extent be devolved to 
implementing entities at national and potentially also sub-national level. That is, 
developing countries should be given the possibility for direct access. These entities 
could take the form of national climate funds that would need to be accredited by 
the fi nancial mechanism. Exceptions to this general approach could be international 
co-operation ventures, for example on technology, and direct access to adaptation 
funding for the groups that are most vulnerable to climate change.
Such a new global climate fund should be established and operate under the authority 
and guidance of the COP and be fully accountable to it. 
Setting up these fi nancing institutions at national and international level would be a 
lengthy process. In addition, industrialised countries are as a matter of principle very 
reluctant to decrease their control of the funding they provide. To accommodate these 
practical problems and divergent political positions, an evolutionary approach could be 
taken to the development of the fi nancial architecture. A strong fund could be created 
under the UNFCCC, which could as a minimum receive the resources fl owing from interna-
tional aviation and maritime transport. The resources that fl ow directly from industrialised 
country governments could remain under their control for the time being, but the global 
climate fund should coordinate the resource fl ows.
The global climate fund could then develop fi duciary criteria for national climate funds 
within the recipient countries. Countries whose national funds meet these criteria could 
then become eligible to receive 100% of their fi nancing needs through the global climate 
fund. As more and more countries meet these eligibility criteria, the required resources 
would start to exceed those available from international aviation and shipping and indus-
trialised countries would hence be more and more required to channel their resources 
through the global fund. At the same time, developing countries would have an incentive 
to create and maintain robust national institutions in order to become eligible for funding 
through the global fund, instead of having to “shop for donors”.
Combating climate change will hardly be possible without the rapid diff usion of mitiga-
tion and adaptation technologies, accompanied by more fundamental changes in the 
patterns of production and consumption. While the agreement should therefore include 
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strong provisions for enhanced technology cooperation, non-technological changes of 
societies should therefore form a key part of national mitigation actions, in particular in 
industrialised countries.
The technology provisions should include a Technology Objective (see above) and a 
Technology Cooperation Mechanism (see chapter 8). The Cooperation Mechanism should 
include elements that enable cooperative research, development and demonstration 
(RD&D) of new as well as the rapid diff usion of existing environmentally sound and low-
carbon technologies. The mechanism could fi nancially be based on a funding window 
under the global climate fund. With regard to content, strategic programming based on 
national need assessments and technology road maps will help to implement joint diff u-
sion and RD&D programmes to achieve the ambitious Technology Objective. 
The system to measure, report and verify (MRV) Parties’ eff orts should be as stream-
lined as possible (see chapter 9). Assessing the emission impacts of specifi c actions is far 
from straightforward. Therefore, MRV of emissions and of actions should be separated. 
Emissions should be MRVed at an aggregate level through robust national inventories. 
Implementation of actions should be MRVed based on performance indicators, includ-
ing emission reductions achieved where this is possible in a straightforward manner, and 
documented in regular reports.
To be able to take into account the rapid advances of climate science, the Copenhagen 
agreement should contain a review clause combined with a full-scale evaluation of the 
environmental eff ectiveness of the provision or agreement (see chapter 10). At the lat-
est, the fi rst such review of the Copenhagen agreement should be conducted in 2014/15, 
after the release of the fi fth IPCC assessment report as currently scheduled.
To make sure this review actually takes place, the Copenhagen agreement should include 
a default emission reduction obligation for industrialised countries. This default obliga-
tion would take eff ect if negotiations on future targets are delayed or unsuccessful and 
defi ne a linear trajectory reducing the emissions of each industrialised country by 95% 
below 1990 levels by 2050.
10
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The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions 
of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a 
level should be achieved within a time-frame suffi  cient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally 
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner.  (Art. 2 UNFCCC)
Humanity is conducting an unprecedented experiment with the natural basis of its very 
existence. The amount of fossil fuel resources that are currently burned per year required 
about 1 million years to be generated. Given the current state of the climate negotiations, 
the 21st century may well see a temperature increase of 3-6°C above pre-industrial levels. 
In the extreme this would even be more than the temperature diff erence between the 
last glacial maximum (18,000 years ago) and the present interglacial (Holocene). The tem-
perature rise out of the last ice age took about 8,000 years — humanity is about to trigger 
an equivalent temperature increase within 200 years. Hence, Crutzen (2002) declared our 
geological age to be human-dominated and proposed to call it the “Anthropocene”. 
The “ultimate objective” of international climate policy is laid down in Art. 2 UNFCCC: To 
stop anthropogenic climate change, and to do this at a time scale that prevents an anthro-
pogenic interference with the climate system of an extent that is to be judged as ‘danger-
ous’. The aim to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations can be likened to stabilis-
ing the water level in a bathtub, or rather the level of liquid waste in a waste dump: The 
amount of anthropogenic infl ows must at a minimum not exceed the level of outfl ows. 
The natural outfl ows, the absorption of GHGs by the oceans and other natural sinks, is 
below 10 Gt CO2-eq. per year. Anthropogenic infl ows are approaching 50 Gt CO2-eq. per 
year (IPCC 2007: 36). That is, infl ows are currently fi ve tims higher than outfl ows. As a result 
the level of waste in the atmospheric “waste dump” is rapidly approaching the point of 
spillover.
Given these current emission trends the objective of the FCCC is on the one hand very clear 
and ambitious. But on the other hand this objective does not provide a clear direction, 
since there has so far not been any coordinated attempt at UNFCCC level to defi ne what 
level of climate change should be considered to be “dangerous” — what is the atmospheric 
waste level that should not be exceeded? The EU and an increasing number of other coun-
tries have committed themselves to a defi nite understanding of the “danger” threshold as 
an increase of the global mean temperature above 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. 
More than 100 countries, including the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the least 
developed countries (LDCs) and a number of other developing countries, have recently 
requested to aim for a global temperature increase of not more than 1.5°C.
However, even a defi nition of the “danger” threshold in terms of temperature change 
does not provide a clear direction of global emissions since temperature change is itself 
(only) one of the delayed manifestations of climate change, not the cause, which can be 
addressed by policy, that is, emissions. To make a temperature target operational, climate 
science fi rst needs to determine which levels of GHG concentration in the atmosphere 
would lead to which level of temperature change, and which amount of GHG emissions 
over time would lead to which levels of GHG concentrations. That is, at which level should 
1 Into the Anthropocene
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the accumulated waste be stabilised and how much waste may fl ow into the waste dump 
for the total amount inside to still stay at or below the desired stabilisation level?
The fourth assessment report of the IPCC (AR4) (IPCC 2007) received enormous headlines, 
but the two most important fi ndings were actually rarely covered, even though they have 
signifi cant implications for reaching any given temperature target:
3 The IPCC revised its “best estimate” of climate sensitivity. Climate sensitivity is a meas-
ure of how sensitive the climate system is to an increase in GHG concentrations, meas-
ured as the mean atmospheric temperature increase that may result from a doubling 
of atmospheric CO2 concentrations. With the AR4, the IPCC revised its best estimate 
of this central parameter from 2.5 to 3°C, that is, it now estimates the climate system, 
indicated by its (longterm) temperature response, to be one fi fth more sensitive than 
previously estimated by the IPCC in its history (1).  This means, put the other way 
around, that if temperature increase is to be kept below a given level, such as 2 or 
1,5°C, GHG concentrations — the waste level in the atmospheric waste dump — will 
have to be kept lower than previously assumed.
3 How close humanity already is to the danger zone is not only dependent of climate 
sensitivity — what level of waste in the waste dump will have what temperature 
impact — but also of the amount of waste that has already fl own into the dump. AR4 
established that the level of GHG emissions reached in 2004 was about 49 Gt CO2-eq. 
per year. This is 5 Gt, about 15%, higher than assumed in the emission scenarios devel-
oped by an IPCC working group 10 years before and which are the basis used in any 
backward calculation of GHG trajectories which are compatible with the 2°C target 
available from science so far. The increase stems mostly from inclusion of emissions 
from peat forests, which had so far not been included in the IPCC assessments. This 
means in terms of temperature targets that much of the (already limited) space for 
accumulated emissions of GHGs in the atmosphere that was previously thought to be 
still available has in fact already been consumed. 
The lowest stabilisation scenarios assessed by the IPCC in AR4 — and which do not take 
into account the additional 5 Gt CO2 emissions from peat forests highlighted above — 
consider stabilisation of atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 350-400 ppm. The IPCC con-
siders that stabilisation at this level would lead to an average temperature increase of 2.0 
to 2.4°C (IPCC 2007: 67). That is, the IPCC has so far not considered any scenario that is 
consistent with the corrected amount of GHG emissions released so far and that would 
stabilise temperature increase below 2°C as the EU and other countries commited them-
selves to. 
Moreover, in 2007 the atmospheric concentration of CO2 had already reached 385 ppm 
CO2, and is rising by 2 ppm per year. That is, the amount of waste accumulated in the 
dump is already at the level that the IPCC considered to lead to a temperature increase 
of 2-2.4°C. If the amount of waste was to be stabilised at this level, the ongoing infl ow 
of waste would in principle have to be immediately reduced to the level of outfl ows. 
Obviously, such drastic reductions are phyiscally impossible. The world is therefore com-
mitted to overshooting the atmospheric GHG concentration that would correspond to the 
2°C target (Richardson et al. 2009: 18).
The challenge is therefore to limit the “spillover” as much as possible. Annual infl ows need 
to be brought back to the level of outfl ows as quickly as possible, and even further to in 
the future drain the surplus waste that is going to accumulate in the dump in the mean-
time. In addition, the size of the drain needs to be expanded where possible to allow for 
a quicker outfl ow of waste. One option here is to harvest the total mitigation potential 
of organic agriculture or other kinds of agriculture which utilise the sink capacity of soils. 
These have been estimated to off er a potential amounting to 4.5-6.5 Gt CO2-eq. per year 
(Muller and Davis 2009). 
1 The ‘pre-IPCC Assess-
ments’ derived a fi gure 
of 3°C, the value to 
which the IPCC now 
came back.
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As for the infl ows, as the level of waste in the dump is the result of the cumulative infl ows 
over time, the mitigation challenge can be framed in terms of a cumulative global carbon 
budget, that is, the amount of waste that may fl ow into the atmospheric dump over a 
certain period of time. According to new studies, meeting the 2°C target with a likelihood 
of 75% would require total global CO2 emissions over the period 2000-2050 to be kept 
at a maximum of 1000 Gt CO2. It bears noting that such a low probability of preventing 
damage would be inacceptable in other contexts such as traffi  c safety or infection risks. In 
addition, out of this budget, about 350 Gt have already been emitted from 2000 to 2009 
(WBGU 2009: 24f ).  
The remaining cumulative budget from now to 2050 can be translated into various trajec-
tories for annual emissions until 2050. If annual infl ows start going down immediately, the 
annual rate of reduction can be kept relatively moderate. If annual infl ows keep increasing 
over the next years, subsequent reductions will have to be much more ambitious. If it was 
possible to stop the growth of global CO2 emissions in 2011, emissions would afterwards 
have to be reduced by on average 3.7% annually to keep a good chance of meeting the 
2°C target. In this case, in 2050 there would still be space for global CO2 emissions at about 
6 Gt, about 20% of 1990 levels. That is, even if very swift and ambitious action is taken, 
global CO2 emissions will have to be reduced by about 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 
(WBGU 2009: 16). 
If the global peak was delayed until 2015, annual global emissions would need to be 
reduced by 5% thereafter to achieve the same stabilisation level. If the peak was delayed 
until 2020, annual global emissions would need to be reduced by 9%, which hardly seems 
feasible. In these two cases, where the global emissions peak is delayed to 2015 or even 
2020, the cumulative carbon budget would be exhausted before 2050. That is, the amount 
of waste in the atmospheric dump would reach such levels within the next few years that 
afterwards annual infl ows would need to be reduced below zero to drain the surplus 
waste that would have accumulated (WBGU 2009: 16).
Given that the current economic crisis has led to some emission reductions and that the 
Copenhagen conference should have the aim to result in an ambitious agreement, the 
pathway leading to an 80% reduction by 2050 on a global scale may be taken as a viable 
basis for the moment. While the fi gures cited above are for CO2 only, statically transposing 
such a minimum reduction of 80% to the whole Kyoto basket of greenhouse gases, which 
in 1990 stood at about 39.4 Gt CO2-eq. per year, yields a requirement to reduce emissions 
to less than 10 Gt CO2-eq. per year (cf. IPCC 2007: 36). Such reduction levels have to be 
put into relation to the global population in 2050, which is projected at around 9 billion 
people (UN DESA 2009a). This means that the global GHG budget in 2050 will average 
about 1 t per person.
Actual emissions in all countries should also equalise at about this level. If substantial parts 
of the global population still had substantially higher emissions in 2050, this would need 
to be compensated for by equally substantial parts of the world’s population having emis-
sions substantially below 1 t. However, there is no viable ethical basis to argue that some 
people should have a right to have a far greater access to the atmospheric commons than 
other people. And politically a long-term continuation of unequal per capita emissions 
will hardly be acceptable to developing countries.
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2 Taking a Broader Perspective
In addition to emission targets, the future climate regime should take a broader perspec-
tive that departs from its so far exclusive focus on emission reductions. On the one hand, 
emission reduction targets are necessary as a yardstick to measure whether eff orts are 
ecologically adequate. On the other hand, however, focussing exclusively on emission 
reductions is a solely “negative” perspective: To get out of something. This perspective has 
arguably so far not been able to engender the swift societal dynamics that are now neces-
sary to fundamentally reorient the very basis of the economy.
Therefore, the “negative” vision of emission reductions should be complemented by a 
positive vision of the direction society wants to travel in. One key element of this vision 
should be: Sustainable energy services for all. The implications of the global 80% target 
become clear when looking at the shares of GHG sources. Energy-related CO2 emissions 
account presently for about 60% of total GHG emissions. The other share of about 40 % 
comes from industrial gases and biogenic sources, in particular methane emissions from 
agriculture and CO2 emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.  
Changing forms of rice cultivation and livestock farming all around the world would seem 
to be rather more challenging than changing centrally-organised fossil-fuel based energy 
infrastructures. Hence, it will hardly be possible to reduce emissions from all sources at the 
same rate as the required global emission decrease. Instead, emissions from fossil fuels 
and industrial gases may have to be reduced to close to zero by mid-century, to account 
for the smaller opportunities to reduce biogenic emissions.
This implies a full shift to renewable energy sources, but it also implies a drastic reduction 
of energy consumption. Only if energy demand is reduced substantially below projected 
levels will it be possible for renewable sources to fully meet the remaining demand. If 
energy demand grows unabated, it will not be possible to scale up renewable energy 
supply quickly enough to fully meet this rising demand. What is therefore necessary is 
a fundamental economic societal transformation at a scale that is probably comparable 
only to the transformation engendered by the industrial revolution.
Figure 1:
Current and Projected 
Global Emissions and 
Necessary Emission 
Reduction. Source: 
Wuppertal Institute 2009
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In addition to global mid-term and long-term emission targets, the Copenhagen agree-
ment should therefore also include global targets for the reduction of energy consump-
tion and the growth of renewable energy sources. The purpose of these targets would 
be to serve as strategic guidelines for the elaboration and implementation of mitgation 
actions by industrialised and developing countries. 
Such a complementary approach has in fact already been taken by the EU through its 
20-20-20 target: to by 2020 achieve a renewable energy supply of 20%, effi  ciency improve-
ments of 20% compared to baseline and emission reductions of at least 20% compared to 
1990. The same approach will probably now be taken in the USA with the legislation cur-
rently in Congress. Apart from creating a positive vision such an approach can also serve 
a very practical purpose: To guard against meeting short-term emission targets through 
incremental improvements only, which may lead to stranded investments in high-emis-
sion infrastructure that, while compatible with short-term emission targets, would not be 
compatible with long-term requirements. Instead, the long-term goal of a zero-emission 
economy needs to be incorporated into all future investments decisions.
The current pace of climate science and climate change itself are leaving behind not only 
climate policy but also energy research. Although existing global energy scenarios have 
ambitious targets, none of them can achieve a reduction of global GHG emissions by 80% 
below 1990 levels by 2050 (e.g. EREC and Greenpeace 2008; WEO of IEA 2009). Given the 
need for highly ambitious reductions of global emissions until 2050, much greater eff orts 
are necessary than scheduled in the existing world energy scenarios. The pathways to 
allow such an increase in RE technologies and decrease of energy intensity need to be 
further elaborated. Thus, the following fi gures are for the time being indicative illustra-
tions and assumptions of the scale of transformation that would be needed to meet the 
2°C target:
3 Aim to improve global average energy intensity by at least 3.5% per year until 2050 
(for example, the current target of China is to reduce energy intensity by 4% per year; 
Germany has the target to reduce it by 3% per year. Therefore it seems to be feasible 
to globally achieve a reduction of 3.5% per year). 
3 Aim to reduce global per capita fi nal energy demand by 5% in 2020, by 10% in 2030 
and by 20 to 30% in 2050 (2). 
3 A long-term goal should be set to obtain the complete global primary energy supply 
from renewable sources. The following mid-term assumptions could help to promote 
this development:
– Share of renewable energy in primary energy supply (currently around 14%) should 
increase at least to 25% by 2020 and minimum 40% by 2030. (3) 
– The share of renewable energy in heat and power supply should increase to close 
to 40% in 2020 and 55% in 2030. (4)  Currently, the share of RE in heat supply is 
around 25% and around 19% in electrical power supply.  
– Global installed electricity generation capacity from renewable energy is currently 
around 1200 GW and should increase to at least 3,000 GW by 2020 and 6,000 GW 
by 2030. (5)
3 Global public funding for research, development and demonstration for mitigation 
and adaptation should be signifi cantly increased to at least €15 billion/year by 2015 
and to at least €20 billion/year by 2020 (currently assumed at €4 – 7 billion/a (EGTT 
2009)). 
3 To realise the component of achieving sustainable energy services for all, the goal 
should be set to secure access to modern energy services for everyone by 2025.
3 Global revolution scenario 
shows the option to increase 
the share of RE in PE to 31% 
by 2030 (Greenpeace/EREC 
2008). 
2 Proposal based on the 
 energy consumption trends 
underlying scenarios that 
achieve 50 % worldwide 
GHG emission reduction by 
2050, such as Greenpeace/
EREC 2008 or Lovins/Hen-
nicke 1999. These show that 
global primary energy con-
sumption can be kept stable 
through energy effi ciency 
through to 2050, which is 
equivalent to a 30 % reduc-
tion of per capita primary 
energy consumption by 
2050 compared to 2005. We 
estimate that this is equiva-
lent to 20 %  reduction of 
per capita fi nal energy con-
sumption by 2050, with the 
difference to 30 % in prima-
ry energy reduction coming 
from supply-side effi ciency, 
such as cogeneration of heat 
and power. As we need to 
achieve much more than 
50 % worldwide GHG emis-
sion reduction by 2050, we 
set the target for fi nal energy 
somewhat higher than in the 
existing scenarios, without 
knowing whether 30 % will 
be attainable. We propose a 
fi nal energy target to dem-
onstrate the need to improve 
energy end-use effi ciency, 
which has the biggest poten-
tial but tends too often to be 
neglected.
4 The global revolution sce-
nario shows an increase of 
the share of RE in heat sup-
ply to 35% in 2020 and 45% 
in 2030; in electricity gener-
ation the share of RE is sup-
posed to increase to 32.5% 
in 2020 and 48% in 2030 
(Greenpeace /EREC 2008). 
5 The installed capacity of 
re newable energy technolo-
gies varies widely in the 
alternative global energy… 
… scenarios, depending on 
the different development of 
primary energy demand in 
the scenarios (Martinot et al. 
2007). Thus the given num-
bers are assumptions that 
will depend on the global 
development of the primary 
and fi nal energy demand.
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As regards the feasibility of meeting such targets, the growth of renewable energy use in 
Germany is one example where developments have constantly outperformed even opti-
mistic assumptions. For example, the target of reaching a renewables share of 12.5% in 
electricity production in 2010 was already reached in 2007, in 2008 the share mounted 
further to 14.8% (Umweltbundesamt 2009). But it does indeed seem likely that the poten-
tial of technology to achieve the necessary reductions will be insuffi  cient and will there-
fore have to be accompanied by more fundamental changes in the patterns of production 
and consumption, particularly by the wealthy among the world’s population.
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3  The Case for a Strategic Global Invest-
ment Programme for the Global South
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefi t of present and future genera-
tions of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed coun-
try Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse aff ects thereof.
 (Art. 3 UNFCCC)
When determining the consequences of the above fi ndings, the cause behind this 
dilemma has some infl uence on the evaluation: the vast majority of historical emissions 
have been caused by industrialised countries. In addition, signifi cant amounts of emis-
sions have not been caused out of ignorance. Many industrialised countries have failed to 
rein in their emissions even after the consequences for the climate had become clear and 
the Convention been adopted, in which they committed to taking the lead in combating 
climate change. According to the latest compilation of data by the UNFCCC Secretariat, 
GHG emissions from all Annex I countries as a whole decreased by 6.4% from 1990 to 
2000 (excluding LULUCF) (UNFCCC 2009a). Thus, Annex I Parties have jointly attained the 
aim of Article 4.2 of the Convention, to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. However, 
the decrease was mainly due to a 41.3% decline in emissions from Central and Eastern 
European countries with economies in transition to a market economy (EIT countries). 
Emissions from non-EIT countries increased by 9.4% until 2000 and in 2006 still stood at 
9.1% above 1990 levels. Moreover, emissions in EIT have recently been growing again as 
well, in 2006 they stood at 37% below 1990 levels.
In addition, Annex I parties have increasingly “outsourced” parts of their industrial emis-
sions through shifts of industrial production to developing countries. Most Annex I coun-
tries have become net importers of carbon dioxide emissions during the last one or two 
decades, while many developing countries have become net exporters. According to 2001 
data, of the 3.6 Gt CO2 imported by developed countries, 44% originated in developing 
countries (Peters and Hertwich 2008). This represents a substantial source of carbon leak-
Figure 2: 
Trends in Annex 
I aggregate 
greenhouse gas 
emissions, 1990-
2006 (excluding 
LULUCF). Source: 
UNFCCC 2009a
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
All Annex I Parties
Annex I non-EIT Parties
Annex I EIT Parties
200620042002200019981996199419921990
Ch
an
ge
 fr
om
 19
90
 le
ve
l (
%
)
8.8
-6.9
-41.3
10.9
-4.6
-38.8
9.9
-4.7
-37.0
3  The Case for a Str tegic Globa  Invest ment 
Programme for the Global South
17
 To w a r d s  a n  E f f e c t i v e  a n d  E q u i t a b l e  C l i m a t e  C h a n g e  A g r e e m e n t  WUPPERTAL INSTITUTE
age, which in eff ect makes it easier for developed countries to comply with their Kyoto 
targets.
On the whole, industrialised countries can therefore hardly claim to have taken the lead in 
combating climate change as they committed to in the Convention.
Industrialised countries do have a point in highlighting that the current emissions 
increases in developing countries are not compatible with meeting the ultimate objective 
of the Convention. But while there is clearly a need to slow emissions growth in develop-
ing countries, the obligation of industrialised countries to take the lead and assume the 
major responsibility for reducing emissions is as valid today as it was in 1992, when the 
Convention was adopted. 
First, the rapid increase of emissions in developing countries in recent years notwith-
standing, emissions per capita of developed countries are still generally much higher than 
those of Southern countries. It would be patently inequitable if the industrialised coun-
tries, by virtue of being wealthier and consuming more fossils fuels both historically and 
currently, depleted the atmosphere’s rapidly diminishing capacity to serve as a safe sink 
for GHG emissions. 
Second, from the point of capability, developing countries face a much more daunting 
challenge than industrialised countries. While industrialised countries are basically fi n-
ished with building up their physical infrastructure, in many developing countries the 
transport infrastructure is patchy to non-existent, decent housing is lacking and an esti-
mated two billion people still have no access to modern energy services for basic needs 
such as lighting, heating and cooking, to name just a few areas. Any defi nition of human 
development that provides for basic human needs will require signifi cant increases of 
energy-related services to provide for clean and healthy cooking facilities, lighting, access 
to water and sanitary facilities, health services etc. 
Still, the easiest and most proven development pathway to alleviate poverty is the devel-
opment pathway followed in Western countries on the basis of fossil fuel use. The looming 
climate crisis eff ectively closes this development pathway and even a highly renewables-
based development pathway that provides decent living conditions to the billions of poor 
people would increase greenhouse gas emission to some extent. A fair distribution of 
what little remains of the atmospheric sink capacity and aff ordable access to emission-
free energy sources are therefore at the heart of the climate challenge.
Figure 3 illustrates this crucial dilemma. It depicts an emissions trajectory reaching an 
80% reduction of global CO2 emissions by 2050 (red line).  (6)   Industrialised countries are 
assumed to pursue a very ambitious reduction path reaching a 90% reduction of domes-
tic emission by 2050 (blue line). Subtraction yields the atmospheric space that remains for 
developing countries: Despite the very ambitious assumption for industrialised countries, 
developing country emissions would still also need to peak before 2020 and be rapidly 
reduced thereafter. 
Developing countries therefore face a triple challenge: (1) to further build up their econo-
mies and basic infrastructure, and to do this in a way that (2) causes as few emissions as 
possible and (3) is adapted to the increasing impacts of climate change. 
Furthermore, many developing countries do not even have the necessary capital to meet 
their basic development needs. To the contrary, most are reliant on international capital 
infl ows. They will therefore hardly be able to muster the even higher investments that will 
be necessary to shift to a low-emission development path and to adapt to the impacts of 
climate change.
The only sensible way forward is therefore to approach the climate challenge as a devel-
opment challenge. Meeting these challenges will require a bold strategic approach. Every 
6 As Figure 1 has highlight-
ed, this may not even be 
enough to achieve 80 % of 
GHG emissions reductions.
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coal-fi red power plant that is still built today will emit CO2 for the next 30-40 years, and 
thus make the goal of reducing emissions to 1 t per capita that much harder. What is there-
fore needed is a radical step-change, trillions of investments that under a BAU scenario are 
set to be invested in coal-fi red power plants and other emission-intensive infrastructure 
will need to be redirected and additional investments mobilised; for example to meet the 
higher upfront costs of renewables. Driving capital from high-emission to low-emission 
ventures will require substantial government action in each country to make emission-
intensive investments unprofi table and overcome the manifold fi nancial, economic, insti-
tutional, technical, information and capacity barriers that stand in the way of actually cap-
turing the available mitigation potential. 
History provides an example of a successful investment programme that combined a 
strategic country-driven approach and massive support from outside: The Marshall Plan, 
through which the USA over a period of fi ve years annually invested about 1% of its then 
GDP into the reconstruction of post-war Europe. The reason for the US engagement was 
the perceived strategic threat that Western Europe might fall into the orbit of the Soviet 
Union. If climate policy is to succeed, governments must start treating the climate chal-
lenge as an even more fundamental strategic challenge. 
While the Marshall Plan cannot simply be adopted as a blueprint, it contained several 
principles and elements that appear highly relevant for overcoming the climate chal-
lenge, such as (UN DESA 2009b):
3 Country-drivenness: As a precondition for support the USA required the European 
countries to elaborate reconstruction plans, which needed to include an identifi ca-
tion of what the countries were prepared to do themselves as well as an identifi cation 
of where they needed support.
3 Non-project assistance to government budgets or for fi nancing the balance of pay-
ments.
3 Counterpart funds in local currency established through Marshall Plan aid inside the 
European countries, which lent money to private enterprises to fi nance their recon-
struction.
These elements are easily recognisable in the current negotiations texts in the form of 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions, low-carbon development strategies, needs 
assessments and funding proposals. The challenge is to tie these elements together into 
a coherent strategic approach that is capable of driving the fundamental structural transi-
tion that is needed.
Figure 3: 
Global 80% trajectory, 
ambitious industrialised 
country reductions and the 
remaining atmospheric 
space for developing 
countries. (7)  Source: 
Baer et al. 2008
7 It bears noting that these 
trajectories do not in-
clude the 5 Gt CO2 from 
peat forests highlighted 
above.
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4 Developed Countries: Taking the Lead
What Should be the Targets?
To contribute the domestic emissions reductions required and to enable Southern coun-
tries to continue developing while at the same time reducing emissions and adapting to 
climate change, industrialised countries should assume responsibility for a major share 
of the global eff ort necessary to achieve an emission reduction trajectory as illustrated in 
Figure 1 as well as responsibility for adaptation costs. To the extent that mitigation and 
adaptation activities in developing countries require additional fi nancial and technologi-
cal resources, these resources should be provided by industrialised countries. The scale 
of industrialised country commitments should therefore be broadened and in the future 
consist of three pillars: 
3 Ambitious Kyoto-style national emission reduction targets.
3 A legally binding obligation to support developing countries in mitigating their emis-
sions to climate change.
3 A quantifi ed legally binding obligation to support developing countries in their adap-
tation eff orts. At least for the Least Developed Countries and Small Island States this 
should include full coverage of adaptation costs.
What is the size of that major share of the global eff ort? In our assessment industrial-
ised countries should take responsibility for about 3/4 to 4/5 of the total global mitigation 
eff ort required. This conclusion can be arrived at in diff erent ways. 
The fi rst way is a principle-based approach that tries to interpret and quantify the 
Convention’s criteria of responsibility and capability. One such interpretation has been 
elaborated in the the Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR) Framework (Baer et al. 2008). 
Crucially, the GDR framework takes into account intranational diff erences by introducing 
a “development threshold”, a level of income put at 7,500 USD (adjusted for purchasing 
power parity). People above this threshold are assumed to have achieved meeting their 
basic needs to an acceptable extent and have some disposable income, whereas people 
below the threshold are assumed to be still struggling to meet basic needs and should 
therefore not be drawn on to combat climate change. This development thresholds acts 
as a form of tax exemption in the calculation of capability and responsibility. Looking at 
the aggregate Annex I and non-Annex I shares of the necessary global mitigation eff ort 
thus calculated, the share for Annex I in 2020 amounts to 69% while the share for non-
Annex I amounts to 31%. If there was a global Kyoto-like emission trading system where 
each country assumed targets according to this calculation, for 2020, industrialised coun-
tries as a whole would receive an allocation of emission allowances equal to 37.9% of 1990 
emissions levels whereas developing countries would receive allowances of 258.1% of 
1990 levels. This means, the responsibility to reduce emissions for industrialised countries 
would be equal to around 62 % of their 1990 emissions.
The second way is a more pragmatic approach: To, fi rst, analyse where emissions can be 
reduced and what costs would be involved with making these reductions, and then, sec-
ond, apply the commitment in Art. 4(3) of the Convention according to which industr-
ialised countries shall cover the full agreed incremental costs of actions in developing 
countries.
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Such an analysis has been done by McKinsey on behalf of the ClimateWorks Foundation 
(2009). According to this analysis, global emissions can be reduced by 19 Gt below busi-
ness-as-usual levels by 2020 at costs up to €60/t CO2-eq. Of these 19 Gt of mitigation 
potential, 5 Gt are located in industrialised countries and 14 Gt are located in developing 
countries. Of these 14 Gt in developing countries, 4 Gt have negative abatement costs 
and 10 Gt have positive abatement costs. According to the Convention, these positive 
abatement costs should be covered by industrialised countries. Adding these 10 Gt to the 
5 Gt of abatement potential that is available within industrialised countries leads to the 
conclusion that industrialised countries should cover 3/4 to 4/5 of the global mitigation 
potential as calculated by McKinsey.
Yet another approach which comes to a similar result is to defi ne responsibilities on the 
basis of equal cumulative per capita emissions. The FCCC’s criterion of responsibility has 
been defi ned in the Brazilian proposal as a country’s contribution to temperature increase 
(UNFCCC 1997; La Rovere et al. 2002). As outlined above, keeping a good chance of meet-
ing the 2°C target would require to cap cumulative CO2 emissions in the period from now 
until 2050 at 650 Gt. Even if historical responsibility was completely neglected and only 
these 650 Gt CO2 were distributed, most industrialised countries would receive a budget 
that would last them only for a few years and afterwards they would have to massively 
purchase allowances from developing countries. If historical emissions since 1990 were 
added to the 650 Gt CO2 and the sum then distributed equally per capita, the budget for 
industrialised countries would already be lower than their actual emissions since 1990 
and they would need to start buying allowances immediately (WBGU 2009). Going back 
even further than 1990 would put industrialised countries even further in the red (Pan et 
al. 2008).
Such a long-term budget approach would be especially helpful with regard to the USA. As 
a matter or practical reality it will probably not be possible for the USA to adopt a short-
term emission target in the same order of magnitude as other industrialised countries 
when compared to 1990. Under an approach that assigns cumulative budgets, the USA 
could assume a somewhat more lenient short-term target, to be compensated by more 
stringent reductions in the mid- and long-term.
The climate negotiations could probably be much facilitated if it was possible to adopt a 
principle-based approach to assigning responsibilities such as the GDR Framework or the 
budget approach. For the purpose of the Copenhagen treaty, however, time is likely too 
short to develop such a “world formula” that would be acceptable to all countries. Instead, 
it will probably be necessary to stay within the Kyoto framework for the time being. The 
above considerations nevertheless illustrate that industrialised countries should raise 
their ambition level far above their current proposals.
To fulfi l their domestic obligation, Annex I countries should therefore commit to Kyoto-
style targets at least at the upper end of the 25-40% range considered by the IPCC for the 
450 ppm scenario, that is, 40%. To ensure that strong cuts are done domestically in the 
Annex I countries and emissions start converging to equal per capita levels, only a limited 
use of off sets should be allowed: The use of off sets should be limited to a maximum of one 
quarter of this target, so that industrialised countries would in aggregate have to reduce 
domestic emissions by at least 30% below 1990 levels.
In addition, emission reductions that are achieved in developing countries through off -
set mechanisms count towards the emission targets of industrialised countries. They can 
therefore not be double-counted towards the obligation to fi nancially support develop-
ing countries. Industrialised countries should therefore fulfi ll their international obligation 
through enabling nationally appropriate mitigation actions of developing countries with 
funding outside the carbon market (see section 7). Alternatively, if the carbon market was 
to be the primary channel to create fi nancial fl ows, industrialised countries would need 
21
 To w a r d s  a n  E f f e c t i v e  a n d  E q u i t a b l e  C l i m a t e  C h a n g e  A g r e e m e n t  WUPPERTAL INSTITUTE
to assume targets substantially beyond 40% to create the necessary demand for emission 
reduction credits from developing countries.
The overall responsibility to reduce emissions for the Annex I countries should be equal 
around 60% of their 1990 emissions, as was calculated above using the GDR approach. 
That is, either they adopt an obligation to reduce GHG emissions in developing countries 
through fi nancial support outside the carbon market that together with their Kyoto-style 
targets adds up to 60%, or they increase their own Kyoto-style targets to 60% and accord-
ingly increase the amount of off sets they use.
From Targets to Actions
As the fi rst commitment period has shown, commitments to legally binding emission 
targets do not automatically mean that countries will in fact reduce their emissions. In 
most non-EIT industrialised countries, emissions have continued to increase, in some 
cases drastically, and Kyoto compliance is far from guaranteed. Canada has even offi  cially 
announced that it is not going to meet its target.
Therefore, in addition to targets, industrialised countries should develop commitment 
achievement plans (CAPs). Achieving the necessary steep emission reductions will require 
a fast and fundamental redirection of investments and restructuring of society. This can-
not be accomplished by incrementalist measures but will require a coherent and strategic 
approach that establishes climate protection as a fundamental objective of all policy areas 
and society as a whole. Each industrialised country should therefore develop a coherent 
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vision and action programme for how it wants to achieve a rapid transition to a low-
 emission society.
These plans should be developed in a transparent and participatory process within each 
country. To actually achieve the necessary radical step-change, broad-based support and 
ownership within each country will be needed. The vision and policies and measures pur-
sued by government will need to be actively shared by society as a whole, or otherwise 
the programmes will have a high risk of never making it beyond the paper stage. Indeed, 
the national discussion itself can be a major stimulus for the needed changes.
Therefore, high level cross-ministerial and multi-stakeholder groups that include the gov-
ernment, technicians, representatives of the business community and civil society should 
be established in each country. These groups would be responsible for formulating CAPs 
and national adaptation plans of action (NAPAs) (see section 6). The fi nal plans would be 
approved and submitted internationally by the national governments, which would also 
be responsible for the implementation. The multi-stakeholder groups would monitor 
implementation of the plans and actions and report to the FCCC, in parallel to the report-
ing by governments (Aprodev 2009). 
The CAPs of industrialised countries should have two parts:
3 A target achievement plan, laying out the policies and measures each country will use 
to meet its reduction commitment.
3 A support achievement plan, laying out how each industrialised country is going to 
fulfi ll its obligation to deliver fi nancial, technological and capacity building support 
for mitigation and adaptation to developing countries.
The CAPs should be submitted to an international review process. Such a process could 
help to achieve at least three goals:
1. Scrutiny by independent external experts would probably improve the quality of the 
plans and thus help to facilitate compliance with the commitments.
2. It would help to build the much-needed international trust by demonstrating that 
industrialised countries are indeed taking the lead and putting into eff ect the neces-
sary short- and long-term measures to drastically reduce their emissions.
3. It could be very helpful for facilitating policy learning between countries.
The concrete modalities for the development and review of the CAPs should build on 
the modalities already in place for the development and review of national communi-
cations, GHG inventories etc. In addition, in its post-2012 communication the European 
Commission (2009a) has proposed very concrete ideas for how to ensure that developing 
countries achieve a pre-defi ned level of mitigation, which should fi rst and foremostly be 
applied to industrialised countries. In particular, the modalities for CAPs should include 
the following elements:
3 Under the Copenhagen agreement, all developed countries should commit to adopt-
ing Commitment Achievement Plans at least two years prior to the start of each new 
commitment period. To ensure that the CAPs have a level of ambition suffi  cient to 
meeting the country’s obligations, the CAPs should be submitted to an international 
review. 
3 Draft CAPs for the second commitment period 2013-2017 should be submitted by 1 
March 2010 at the latest and full plans by 30 September 2010.
3 These CAPs should set out a credible pathway to limit the country’s emissions in line 
with its reduction target through mitigation actions that cover all sectors. This path-
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way should cover both medium-term goals, including the target for the next com-
mitment period or periods as agreed in Copenhagen, as well as the long-term goal to 
lower emissions to 1 t per person by 2050. Ideally, the CAPs should break the national 
targets down to sectoral targets to end the current situation where for example trans-
port emissions have been growing with hardly any constraint.
3 In addition, the CAPs should set out reliable sources to generate new fi nances, so as to 
meet the country’s international fi nancial and technology obligations.
3 The review process would be undertaken by the Mitigation Panel under a newly 
established Financial Mechanism Board (FMB) (see section 7) and could build on the 
procedures already in place for the assessment of Annex I national communications, 
initial resports, GHG inventories etc. (see section 9).
3 Where the review process fi nds that a CAP is not in line with meeting the country’s 
obligations, the analysis should explore options to raise the level of ambition of the 
CAP. 
3 The Conference of the Parties should review the results of the analysis and may decide 
to request industrialised countries to revise their CAPs to ensure that they are consist-
ent with meeting their obligations.
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5  Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions by Developing Countries
To give clear directions for all future investments and make strategic use of the resources 
to be provided by industrialised countries, Southern countries should ideally develop 
integrated Low-Carbon Development Strategies (LCDS). These LCDS should set out a long-
term vision for low-emission development as well as comprehensive nationally appropri-
ate mitigation actions (NAMAs) covering all the key emitting sectors that are needed to 
implement this vision. To benefi t from synergies and to avoid trade-off s between miti-
gation and adaptation, LCDS and Adaptation Strategies or National Adaptation Plans of 
Actions (NAPAs) could be compiled into an integrated strategy for climate-proof develop-
ment (see section 6).
As in the case of industrialised countries, these plans should be developed in a transpar-
ent and participatory process through high level cross-ministerial and multi-stakeholder 
groups for two reasons (UN DESA 2009b):
3 As argued above for industrialised countries, actually achieving the necessary radical 
step-change will require broad-based support and ownership within each country.
3 In addition, demonstrably broad-based popular support can be a powerful vehicle to 
persuade donors to tailor their support to the recipients’ priorities, rather than cherry-
picking measures according to their own priorities.
The actions taken by developing countries should be inscribed into an international reg-
ister under the UNFCCC and would need to be “MRVable” — measurable, reportable and 
verifi able — to qualify for fi nancial and technological support. The guidance and require-
ments for elaborating NAMAs, as well as the assessment process could be inspired by 
the reporting infrastructure that is already in place under the FCCC. However, the cur-
rent provisions for non-Annex I reporting are probably not adequate for robustly assess-
ing NAMAs, so the process could also incorporate elements of current Annex I reporting 
and reviewing. The following modalities for the elaboration and MRV of LCDS and NAMAs 
could be envisioned:
3 LCDS should be grounded in a strategic vision to limit national emissions to 1 t per 
capita by 2050. 
3 LCDS should be organised by sectors and subdivided by greenhouse gas. 
3 Proposed NAMAs should include a robust assessment of their mitigation potential.
3 Furthermore, they should include an elaboration of the costs and benefi ts of imple-
mentation and, where applicable, other constraints to implementation. In particular, 
NAMAs should clearly identify where fi nancial and technological support is required. 
3 The description of the mitigation potential, costs and required support should include 
a description of the methodology and assumptions used.
3 Proposed NAMAs should also include possible indicators to ex-post measure the suc-
cess of each NAMA.
3 The review process would be undertaken by the Mitigation Panel under a newly 
established Financial Mechanism Board (FMB) (see section 7) and could build on the 
procedures already in place for the assessment of Annex I national communications, 
initial reports, GHG inventories etc. (see section 9).
5  Nationally Appro riate Mitigation Actions 
by Devel ping Countries
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3 Once a country’s LCDS or NAMAs have been judged to be robust, the country qualifi es 
for fi nancial support as outlined in section 7. 
Many developing countries have in recent years already formulated national mitigation 
strategies and have the capacity to further develop them. Most developing countries, 
however, will probably require signifi cant capacity building to be able to prepare LCDS and 
NAMAs. Industrialised countries should commit to cover the full costs related to preparing 
NAMAs and LDCS and to deliver the necessary capacity building to enable developing 
countries to meet the related requirements. Nevertheless, development of comprehen-
sive LCDS may be too onerous for many developing countries, at least in the short term. 
Development of comprehensive LCDS should therefore be voluntary for most developing 
countries, leaving them the option to propose specifi c individual NAMAs rather than com-
prehensive plans if they prefer.
To safeguard the environmental eff ectiveness of the agreement, however, development 
of comprehensive plans should be a requirement for countries exceeding a certain thresh-
old, such as contributing at least 1% to global emissions. In addition, from a political point 
of view, ratifi cation of the Copenhagen treaty by industrialised countries will probably 
hinge on knowing what the large developing countries are prepared to do. Therefore, for 
those countries that exceed the to-be agreed threshold, the following additional provi-
sions should apply:
3 These countries should commit to submitting a fi rst draft LCDS by 1 June 2010 at the 
latest and a full strategy by 1 January 2011.
3 In addition, the LCDS of these countries should establish credible pathways to limit 
emissions and indicate their level of ambition. To this end, two emission projections 
should be provided:
– A projection without implementation of the proposed LCDS
– A projection with implementation 
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Given the urgency of achieving a peak and decline of global emissions, the international 
framework should include the possibility to fast-track implementation of specifi c NAMAs 
where the assessment is straightforward. The selection of such NAMAs should be guided 
by the Technology Objectives and Roadmaps (see sections 2 and 8). As a new fi nancial 
mechanism will probably take several years to establish, industrialised countries should 
pledge to provide adequate amounts of support for such fast-start strategies.
Finally, several non-Annex I countries have in the meantime attained levels of devel-
opment and per capita emissions that are comparable to or even exceeding those of a 
number of Annex I countries. A situation where countries with comparable responsibil-
ity and capability are required to make contributions of a diff ering legal and substantive 
nature is clearly not equitable. 
The South-North dialogue (Ott et al. 2003) therefore defi ned a category of countries called 
newly industrialised countries and proposed that these countries should be required to 
assume legally binding quantifi ed emission targets. The group is composed of the coun-
tries that score highest on the South-North index, which includes criterias for responsibil-
ity, capability and mitigation potential. According to the South-North proposal, the list of 
newly industrialised countries would include: Bahrain, Brunei, Cuba, Israel, Kazakhstan, 
South Korea, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan.
Meyer et al. (2009) propose that the Conference of the Parties should defi ne a thresh-
old, and countries that exceed this threshold should be required to assume legally bind-
ing quantifi ed emission targets. They suggest that a GDP per capita at purchasing power 
parity higher than 20,000 USD/year could be an appropriate indicator. According to this 
threshold, this group of countries would include: Bahamas, Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Korea, Trinidad & Tobago and the United 
Arab Emirates. 
Evidently, both approaches require further refi nement as for some countries the appear-
ance on these lists is rather surprising. In particular, the lists include small island devel-
oping states who will have to bear a heavy burden because of the impacts of climate 
change.
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6  Facilitating Action on Adaptation 
in Developing Countries
As mentioned above, developed country Parties should take the lead in combating the 
adverse aff ects of climate change (Art. 3 UNFCCC). They should do so through a quantifi ed 
legally binding obligation to support Southern countries in their adaptation eff orts, both 
fi nancially and through capacity building and knowledge sharing. To do so, international 
fi nance for adaptation needs to be scaled up massively (see chapter 7).
Similar to CAPs, NAMAs and LCDS, all countries should commit to develop National 
Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs) and — in the mid-term — more integrated National 
Adaptation Strategies to inform adaptation needs and facilitate adaptation. National 
Adaptation Strategies would be an iterative process, providing a national aim and vision 
for the compiled sub-national adaptation plans and needs (Meyer et al. 2009), and should 
be consistent with national Low-Carbon Development Strategies and poverty reduction 
goals. To best exploit synergies of adaptation and mitigation and avoid trade-off s, LCDS 
and Adaptation Strategies could be compiled into an integrated strategy for climate-
proof development. These strategies and plans should also include disaster risk assess-
ments and prevention planning to reduce disaster risk and to facilitate the development 
of insurance infrastructures.
Southern countries are entitled to receive appropriate fi nancial support and capacity 
building for the development and implementation of NAPAs and National Adaptation 
Strategies according to their capabilities. Based on the polluter pays principle, fi nance for 
adaptation in developing countries must be regarded as compensation payments and 
should therefore be primarily provided in the form of grants not loans. It also has to be 
provided in addition to the 0.7% GDP commitment on Offi  cial Development Assistance 
(ODA). At least LDCs and SIDS should receive fi nance for the full coverage of adaptation 
costs.
Similar to providing support for fast-track NAMAs, industrialised countries should scale-
up adaptation fi nance now to be used within this commitment period. Especially the $2 
billion funding gap for existing NAPAs must be fi lled immediately (cf. Meyer et al. 2009).
A reformed fi nancial mechanism should also include a climate risk insurance, as well as a 
compensation mechanism (Eichhorst et al. 2009). The insurance mechanism should con-
sist of: 
3 An international climate insurance pool to cover high-level risks, and 
3 A Climate Insurance Assistance Facility (CIAF) for middle layer risks, which would off er 
capacity building and fi nancial support for setting up and operating private and pub-
lic-private disaster risk insurance schemes in developing countries. 
The compensation mechanism would be designed to cover residual risks, i.e. those dam-
ages and losses that cannot be addressed by pro-active adaptation measures identifi ed in 
national adaptation plans or strategies and cannot be covered by the insurance mecha-
nism, such as inundation of low-lying island states by sea-level rise (Meyer et al. 2009; 
MCII 2008). Access to the compensation mechanism and the climate insurance pool could 
be contingent on the implementation of risk reduction measures identifi ed in NAPAs or 
adaptation strategies, provided that those are adequately supported by developed coun-
tries.
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As mentioned above, multi-stakeholder groups would be responsible for formulating 
NAPAs and National Adaptation Strategies, helping to ensure the participation of (advo-
cates of ) the most vulnerable groups. They would also monitor implementation, including 
risk prevention measures (cf. Aprodev 2009). 
While additional fi nance needs to be generated at the international level, at the national 
level developing countries can improve their institutions/structures to identify and 
absorb both new and existing funding options for adaptation from within and outside 
of the UNFCCC. These processes can learn from the experiences made under the Global 
Mechanism of the United Nations Convention on Combating Desertifi cation (UNCCD) in 
setting up country-specifi c Integrated Financing Strategies (IFCs) for sustainable land man-
agement and mainstreaming land management into countries’ development. Transferring 
these experiences to the adaptation context holds a lot of potential for replication since 
land management is similarly cross-sectoral, even though the scope of adaptation is even 
larger.
The main idea of Integrated Financing Strategies for Adaptation would be to examine the 
national institutional, legislative and fi nancial frameworks for adaptation activities and 
to identify current fi nancial fl ows into adaptation to identify opportunities and barriers 
for implementation of adaptation projects, (ideally) as identifi ed in NAPAs and National 
Adaptation Strategies (Eichhorst et al. 2009). In a next step all potential funding sources 
for adaptation, including both national public spending, private sector initiatives and 
international adaptation funding or other funding programmes, the resources of which 
could also be used for certain adaptation actions, would be identifi ed and budgetary 
decision-making analysed. On this basis an action plan could be developed, highlighting 
the main activities necessary to mobilise additional resources for adaptation planning and 
implementation. These activities should address institutional and legal framework condi-
tions (creating an enabling environment), internal budget distribution, as well as enhanc-
ing resource mobilisation from external sources of funding, such as the a new fi nancial 
mechanism, but also funds outside of the UNFCCC. Where required, the UNFCCC should 
provide assistance and capacity building for the development of such integrated fi nance 
strategies for adaptation similar to the support provided for the development of NAPAs.
Developing Integrated Financing Strategies could help to improve the overall absorptive 
capacity in developing countries and to eff ectively use available funding. However, they 
cannot overcome the problem of the current lack of predictable funding for adaptation. 
This additional funding will have to be provided under a reformed fi nancial mechanism, 
providing easy and direct access to adaptation funds. 
Nevertheless, the analysis and development of an Integrated Financing Strategy for 
adaptation could also help identify the funding needs for adaptation sub-sectors in par-
ticular countries, identify synergies with other existing programmes such as the Hyogo 
Framework for Action on disaster risk reduction and promote mainstreaming of adap-
tation into national development planning. Integrated Finance Strategies could thus 
become an integral part of National Adaptation Strategies.
In the meantime, actions on adaptation should continue to follow a learning-by-doing 
approach and also explore the opportunities of public-private partnerships for adapta-
tion. Even though public-private partnerships are not predictable on a large scale, they 
can play an important complimentary role to public funding. Finally, information sharing 
should be further supported through continuation of the Nairobi Work Programme on 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, as well as through new or existing regional adapta-
tion centres or networks.
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7 A Reformed Financial Mechanism
The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall provide 
new and additional fi nancial resources … including for the transfer of technology, needed 
by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing 
measures …  (Art. 4.3 UNFCCC)
Financial Requirements and Deficits of the Current Mechanisms
One fi gure that has often been cited in the fi nancial fl ows paper of the UNFCCC Secretariat 
is that 86% of all global investment and fi nancial fl ows come from private sources, i.e. 
businesses and private households (UNFCCC 2007). Industrialised countries have used 
this fi gure to argue that only limited public funding is necessary for climate protection 
and most of the costs can be borne by the private sector.
This argument is somewhat beside the point, however. Naturally, it is typically not govern-
ments but private actors who fi nance investments for insulating houses or building wind 
parks. But it cannot be expected that private businesess will reduce their profi t margin 
and simply absorb the costs caused by choosing a less GHG-intensive investment. While 
the renewable energy boom in Germany is naturally fi nanced mainly from private sources, 
it required policies to minimise the barriers for triggering these investments, most notably 
the renewables feed-in tariff  (Mendonca 2009). 
In addition, experience from industrialised countries shows that even where investments 
are in principle profi table, such as energy effi  ciency improvements, implementation is 
often nevertheless diffi  cult. Industrialised countries dispose of gigatonnes of no-regret 
or even win-win potential that would generate a net economic benefi t, and yet have so 
far not been very successful in actually achieving these emission reductions. Typically, a 
whole range of formidable fi nancial, institutional, technical, information and capacity bar-
riers prevent implementation, such as limited awareness of energy saving options, land-
lords unwilling to pay for effi  ciency measures that lower tenants’ energy bills but without 
any benefi t to themselves, tenants unwilling to invest in improvements that revert to the 
landlord on lease expiry, limited access to capital or small project sizes coupled with high 
transaction costs. Just as industrialised countries will have to signifi cantly scale up poli-
cies and measures including public fi nancial support to market actors to tap their own 
no-regret potential, developing countries will require signifi cant capacity building and 
fi nancial support for policies and measures to mobilise their no-regret potential.
Developing countries will be hard to motivate to develop ambitious mitigation and adap-
tation plans if they cannot be sure that these will in fact be adequately funded. Instead, 
every country should be reassured that they will receive the necessary funding if they sub-
mit robust programmes. Financial support will be needed for various aspects, such as: 
3 Incremental costs of climate-friendly investments compared to emission-intensive 
business-as-usual ones and fi nancial incentives necessary to overcome non-economic 
barriers (mitigation) 
3 Compensating developing countries for foregoing the use of forest resources in the 
case of reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) (mitiga-
tion)
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3 Adapting infrastructure and economic development to changing climate conditions 
(adaptation) 
3 Establishing climate insurance schemes and providing compensation for unavoidable 
losses and damages, such as inundation by sea-level rise (adaptation)
3 Technology cooperation, as large-scale and rapid diff usion of climate-friendly technolo-
gies and enhanced RD&D can help mitigate and adapt to climate change (technology)
3 Capacity building. 
In addition, in many developing countries coverage of additional costs and enabling poli-
cies may not be enough to trigger investments due to the lack of domestic capital. In less 
mature fi nancial markets, public funding mechanisms are necessary to compensate for a 
lack of private capital and evolving policy environments. These can take a wide variety of 
forms such as grants, credit lines to local commercial fi nance institutions, credit guaran-
tees, loan softening programmes and others. When seeing the commitment of govern-
ments or multilateral institutions, private investors will then often follow suit (MacLean 
et al. 2008). 
The level of funding currently provided for mitigation and adaptation needs to be scaled 
up signifi cantly, though estimations diff er. For example, the 2007 report on investment 
and fi nancial fl ows by the UNFCCC Secretariat estimated that additional investment and 
fi nancial fl ows of 200-210 billion USD would be necessary in 2030 to reduce global GHG 
emissions by 25% below 2000 levels. Almost half of these would be needed in developing 
countries (UNFCCC 2007). McKinsey has estimated that fi nancial needs for mitigation to 
cover incremental costs, higher fi nancing rates in developing countries and transaction 
costs amount to annually 55-80 billion USD (ClimateWorks Foundation 2009). In contrast 
to these fi gures, a recent UN report argues that to really achieve the necessary drastic 
step-change, a “big push” will be needed. That is, much of the necessary investments to 
meet stabilisation targets will need to be frontloaded and probably more than one trillion 
USD in additional investments will be required annually for the next two decades (UN 
DESA 2009b). However, investment generates returns, e.g., on saved fossil fuels, so that 
the net annual fi nancing fl ows will not be as high.
For adaptation in developing countries, several organisations, including the UNFCCC 
Secretariat estimated that several tens of billions will be needed annually (e.g. UNFCCC 
2007, ClimateWorks Foundation 2009). However, a recent study by the International 
Institute for Environment and Development concluded that UNFCCC numbers vastly 
underestimate actual costs, which could range in the hundreds of billions of USD per year 
(Parry et al. 2009).
Regarding the additional fi nancing that will be needed for research, development, dem-
onstration, deployment and diff usion of mitigation technologies in order to stabilise levels 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the UNFCCC Expert Group on Technology Transfer 
has estimated that current fi nancing for mitigation technologies needs to increase by USD 
262-670 billion annually until 2030 — to a total of USD 332 — 835 billion annually (EGTT 
2009). The estimates are sensitive to the baseline and mitigation scenarios used. Most 
R&D and technology transfer for technologies for adaptation is likely to be included in the 
adaptation project spending. 
For mitigation, two basic types of fi nancing mechanisms are currently in operation: Fund-
based mechanisms and emission trading mechanisms, in particular a reformed Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). Resource fl ows from emissions trading will hardly be 
reliable enough nor adequate to incentivise mitigation actions at the scale needed to pre-
vent dangerous climate change. Investments usually require fi nancing before the start of 
the project. CDM credits, however, are only generated when the project is already opera-
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tional. While there are some purchasing programmes where it is possible to receive part of 
the CDM revenue upfront, upfront payment is a trade-off  between receiving early fi nanc-
ing and the amount of CDM fi nancing received: Since there is always a risk that a project 
will fail or not generate as many credits as expected, credits sold upfront fetch a lower 
price than issued credits. 
Moreover, the additional CDM revenue is subject to high risks. Ex ante, project developers 
cannot be sure whether their project will be registered, whether it will actually achieve 
the expected amount of emission reductions and which price they will receive for the 
credits. Relying on CDM revenues to make an otherwise unprofi table project profi table is 
therefore a very uncertain proposition. Moreover, as a result of these risks banks often do 
not take credit revenues into account when deciding on giving a loan to a CDM project 
(Ecosecurities and UNEP Risø 2007: 73). This eff ectively shuts many project developers out 
from one of the most important fi nancing options.
Finally, the environmental integrity of the CDM is very much in doubt. Several studies 
have come to the conclusion that the additionality of many projects is at least question-
able (e.g. Schneider 2007; Wara and Victor 2008). 
As for establishing new crediting mechanisms at government level, it is doubtful whether 
emission trading mechanisms can provide governments with a strong incentive to imple-
ment ambitious climate policies. Sectoral mechanisms would retain the limitations of the 
current project-based CDM in terms of receiving the revenue only ex-post and not being 
able to predict accurately how much revenue will be received. Instead, Southern coun-
tries would need to prefi nance sectoral schemes or NAMAs and run the risk of not being 
able to recoup their costs. Due to these factors, Ward et al. (2008: 71) question whether 
sectoral mechanisms would in fact provide a strong incentive for developing countries 
to implement climate-friendly policies: “As governments are not investing in policies and 
measures to speculate in carbon markets, the volatility of carbon credits may be a serious 
problem for governments.”
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While we therefore consider that fund-based approaches hold a much better promise to 
incentivise the necessary structural changes, the currently existing funds are also charac-
terised by signifi cant shortcomings, many of them similar to the CDM’s defi cits.
Public funds should be able to support the countries that do not attract private fi nance. 
However, under the UNFCCC they have not played such a role so far. This is mainly because 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF) trust fund, the largest public fund currently, is pro-
vided on the basis of the resource allocation framework (RAF), which is based on the crite-
ria of achieving a global environmental benefi t and capacity to implement GEF projects. 
As a result, a large share of the funding is fl owing to China, Brazil, and India. In order to pro-
vide fi nancial resources to other countries, the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and 
the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) were established. In addition, the Adaptation 
Fund was established, which is not a public fund, but fed by a 2% share of proceeds on 
Certifi ed Emission Reductions sales from CDM project activities. Yet, the size of these funds 
is inadequately small. Moreover, they focus on adaptation support.
Moreover, the requirement of incremental cost calculation causes problems for the coun-
tries with less administrative capacity to receive resources from public funds. The require-
ment of calculating incremental costs also results in eliminating many projects that could 
contribute to sustainable development but do not yield a large amount of GHG emissions 
reductions, such as small renewable power projects.
Under the existing fi nancial mechanism the decision on the necessary amount of 
resources for multilateral environmental agreements operated by the GEF is taken by the 
GEF Assembly and the GEF Council. Although the COP provides guidance, it is diffi  cult 
to judge if the GEF in reality refl ects the guidance provided by the COP. For example, the 
fourth Overall Performance Study, an external evaluation of GEF operations, reaffi  rms that 
support is in line with the guidance of the COP, but COP guidance goes beyond the present 
GEF portfolio and strategy, e.g., into adaptation issues, where GEF support has reached a 
level of USD 350 million, but mainly through special funds and programmes (OPS4 2009). 
Moreover, the decision of the GEF Assembly and the GEF Council and even the COP guid-
ance are based on the available resources, not on the amount needed to mitigate global 
warming at the required level (available-resources based approach). 
Furthermore, currently no single organisation coordinates the total amount of resources 
that are available. This makes it diffi  cult to effi  ciently utilise the limited amount of resources 
in an eff ective manner by avoiding duplicated funding for the same objectives.
To truly enable developing countries to shift to a low-carbon and climate-resilient 
development path, the current fi nancial architecture therefore needs to be signifi cantly 
reformed.
Functions and Requirements for a Reformed Financial Mechanism
The reformed fi nancial mechanism should fulfi ll the following functions:
3 To support the development of and to review the nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions, low-carbon development strategies and adaptation plans of developing 
countries
3 To deliver fi nancial, technological and capacity building support to developing coun-
tries for the implementation of these plans and actions
3 To provide the resources necessary for establishing and managing the technology 
cooperation framework (see section 8)
3 To review industrialised countries’ Commitment Achievement Plans. 
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In fulfi lling these functions, the reformed fi nancial mechanism should meet the following 
requirements:
1. Adequacy and additionality: A new fi nancial architecture must generate the amount 
of resources necessary for stabilising the GHG concentrations at a level that is suf-
fi cient to prevent dangerous climate change and suffi  cient to support developing 
countries in adapting to climate change that is unavoidable (or unavoided). In addi-
tion, the Bali Action Plan as well as the UNFCCC constitute the additionality of funds 
to Offi  cal Development Assistance (ODA) as a key criterion. 
2. Climate mitigation impact and refl ection of common but diff erentiated responsibili-
ties, i.e. historical responsibilities and capacity to pay: An instrument should directly 
provide additional incentives for reducing emissions by internalising their social costs 
into the polluters’ calculations. 
3. Representative and democratic governance.
4. Predictability: Resource availability must be reliable. This is important for building 
trust among diff erent countries and for safeguarding the viability of the whole fi nan-
cial architecture, also regarding its catalytic eff ect on private investments. In particu-
lar, the system must not create “darlings” and “orphans”, that is, countries and actions 
that everybody wants to fund and those that receive no funding at all.
5. Minimisation of overlaps and transaction costs.
6. Political feasibility. 
While criteria 1 and 2 relate especially to how to raise funding, criteria 3-5 relate especially 
to how to manage and spend it and criterion 6 relates to both.
Sources of Funding
A variety of proposals has been made on how to fi nance the post-2012 regime, includ-
ing:
3 Assessed contributions from countries on the basis of their responsibility and capabil-
ity.
3 Selling or auctioning of assigned amount units (AAUs).
3 Selling or auctioning of emission allowances in national or regional emission trading 
schemes.
3 A levy or emissions trading with auctioning for international aviation and shipping 
3 A global carbon tax or other international taxes.
3 Extending the share of proceeds on the CDM to the other fl exible mechanisms.
We consider that the international sale of AAUs is the “fi rst-best” solution, for the following 
reasons (Harmeling et al. 2009): 
3 Adequacy and additionality: The sale of AAUs is generally able to generate substantial 
resources in addition to already existing commitments (particularly to the 0.7% ODA 
target).
3 Predictability: Selling AAUs has the potential to create an “automatic” funding mecha-
nism and make the climate regime “self-fi nancing”. In addition, the revenue stream 
could be insulated from market price volatility by choosing to sell AAUs at a fi xed 
price instead of auctioning. 
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3 Climate mitigation impact and refl ection of common but diff erentiated responsibili-
ties, i.e. historical responsibilities and capacity to pay: Selling AAUs complies with the 
polluter-pays principle and provides incentives for further emission reductions in 
industrialised countries. Moreover, it guarantees the equitable inclusion of all indus-
trialised countries (i.e. all countries that will commit to absolute emission targets in 
Copenhagen).
3 Political feasibility. Selling AAUs functions as an “upscaling” of the approach already 
implemented by the EU (auctioning combined with earmarking of revenues), and 
therefore is politically feasible for the countries that have emissions trading schemes. 
In addition, this approach enables governments to pass the obligation to purchase 
AAUs and thereby the ultimate costs on to private emitters. At the moment, it appears 
as if most industrialised countries are going to introduce emission trading schemes 
within the next years.
3 Finally, this approach is technically relatively easy to implement and consistent with 
the structure of the Kyoto Protocol.
In principle, assessed contributions on the basis of criteria for responsibility and capability 
would equally comply with the polluter-pays principle. However, industrialised countries 
do not have a good track record of complying with their fi nancial commitments. Even in 
the case of member states’ contributions to the UN regular budget, which are as legally 
binding as is possible under international law, many member states do not pay their full 
dues. Hence, additional enforcement rules — particularly a credible sanctioning mecha-
nism — would be necessary to safeguard the reliability of the fi nancial fl ows. However, 
the political feasibility of such an adequate sanctioning mechanism is probably very low. 
While there is also no fi nal guarantee that countries will purchase AAUs, this approach has 
the advantage that they do not necessarily have to purchase the AAUs themselves but 
instead may pass on this obligation to private emitters in an emissions trading system.
An additional problem results from the current confi guration of the negotiations. Currently, 
the fi nancial contributions and the emission targets of industrialised countries are nego-
tiated in separate tracks. Depending on AAU auctioning as a new fi nancial source has 
not only the targets but also the fi nancial contributions from the industrialised countries 
depend on the conclusions under the Kyoto Protocol. Recognising this problem, however, 
we still fi nd that AAU auctioning is the best option since both commitments of industrial-
ised countries should be linked. 
The proportion of the AAUs to be set aside would depend on the estimated revenue 
needed and the expected carbon price. In particular, the scale of the funding should be 
based on an assessment of the needs for fi nancial support for mitigation in Southern 
countries in order to achieve a peak of global emissions by 2015 and an 80% reduction 
below 1990 levels by 2050, as well as the needs for adaptation (assuming a temperature 
increase of a minimum of 2°C) (demand-based approach). The revenue needed should 
ultimately be decided by the COP, on the basis of a recommendation provided by the 
Financial Mechanism Board (FMB). 
To take into account countries’ varying responsibility and capability, the quantity of AAUs 
to be withheld from each industrialised country could vary based on its responsibility and 
capability. That is, countries with high responsibility and capability, in particular the G7 
countries, could have a proportionally high share of their AAUs withheld for auctioning, 
whereas countries with a low responsibility and capability could receive more AAUs for 
free.
As so far international aviation and maritime transport are not covered by the Kyoto 
Protocol, it would refl ect the polluter-pays principle, equity considerations and the sheer 
volume of required revenue infl ows that these sectors should be obliged to contrib-
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ute — ideally through their inclusion in an emissions trading system with auctioning of 
the allowances. This is a logical extension of selling AAUs, as international aviation and 
maritime traffi  c are relevant sectors that up to now are excluded from national emissions 
budgets.
Institutional Structure
A broad range of options for the future funding regime can be envisaged and has been 
proposed. These can be described in terms of three descriptive dimensions: 
3 Fragmented or consolidated fl ows, i.e. whether funds fl ow through one or multiple 
channels
3 Centralised or decentralised decisions, i.e. whether funding decisions are taken by a 
central body or not
3 Devolved or Retained, i.e. whether funding decisions are made by recipients them-
selves or not.
These dimensions are a matter of degrees and independent of each other (Müller 2009). 
Conceivable options based on the current negotiations are:
1. Fully fragmented, decentralised and retained: Donors themselves select activities 
they fund, either bilaterally or via established multilateral channels like the GEF. Such 
a system would match the preferences of donor governments, but would hardly be 
predictable for developing countries. In addition, if all donors made their own evalu-
ations, transaction costs would be very high for both donors and recipients.
2. Fully consolidated, centralised and retained: A fund is created under the FCCC that 
takes all funding decisions. Such a system could ensure predictability but would 
entail creating a very large new institution, which could take very long to establish 
and might be very unwieldy. While such a system is being demanded by developing 
countries, it does not seem acceptable to industrialised countries.
3. Fragmented, decentralised and retained funding with a coordinating mechanism 
under the UNFCCC that brings together recipients and resources. Such an approach 
could enhance predictability, but could still involve signifi cant transaction costs for all 
sides to match needs and resources.
4. Fragmented and decentralised funding with consolidation at recipient level. Under 
such a system, donors would negotiate funding with one central entity in each devel-
oping country. Such an approach would enhance coordination of investments, but 
not necesarily predictability of funding streams and could entail high transaction 
costs for all sides similar to option 1. 
5. Fragmented and decentralised funding with consolidation at recipient level and coor-
dination under the UNFCCC. This approach could enhance predictability compared to 
option 4.
6. Consolidation and centralisation of funding with devolution of funding decisions to 
the recipient countries. Such an approach could enhance predictability and coordina-
tion of funding streams, but would require reliable recipient country institutions as 
well as strong international oversight to maintain confi dence among donors.
7. In addition to these archetypical options, a variety of hybrids are conceivable, such 
as creating a strong mechanism under the UNFCCC that is complemented by further 
bilateral and multilateral channels.
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Based on the above criteria and considerations, a consolidated mechanism at UNFCCC 
level does seem recommendable. Such a system could prevent cherry-picking by donors, 
maximise comprehensiveness and allow to exploit synergies. At the same time, care should 
be taken not to create an unwieldy and potentially untransparent bureaucracy under the 
UNFCCC. The mechanism could therefore follow a consolidated-devolved model accord-
ing to option 6:
3 Consolidated: A global climate fund could collect and co-ordinate all fi nancial fl ows 
from industrialised countries and review the NAMAs, LCDS and NAPAs of developing 
countries
3 Devolved: Implementation and specifi c funding decisions would to a large extent be 
devolved to implementing entities at national and potentially also sub-national level. 
That is, countries should be given the possibility for direct access, instead of having to 
work through multilateral institutions. These entities could for example take the form 
of national climate funds that would need to be accredited by the fi nancial mecha-
nism. Exceptions could be international co-operation ventures, for example on tech-
nology, and direct access to adaptation funding for the groups that are most vulner-
able to climate change.
Such a new global climate fund should be established and operate under the authority 
and guidance of the COP and be fully accountable to it. To secure the necessary amount of 
resources for adaptation and mitigation, the COP should determine the needed amount 
of resources every fi ve years and review the decision every year.
The global climate fund could have the following structure:
3 It could be governed by a Financial Mechanism Board that should be accountable to 
the COP. Its tasks could be to support the COP in taking the decision on the needed 
amount of resources, accredit national implementing entities, and to give instructions 
to the trustee on disbursement of resources. The FMB should consist not of govern-
mental representatives but experts who have extensive knowledge about climate 
change, fi nancing, development, infrastructure, forestry, etc. In particular, a specifi ed 
number of seats with full voting rights should be reserved for civil society, as is the 
case in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. At least one seat 
should be reserved for a representative of women’s organisations.
3 Mitigation, adaptation, technology and capacity building should be serviced by one 
specifi c funding window each under the fund. Each of the four windows might have 
further sub-windows, for example a REDD and transport sub-window under the miti-
gation window. REDD and transport have proven to be sectors which pose very partic-
ular challenges to reducing emissions and should therefore receive special attention 
(on transport approaches, cf. Bongardt et al. 2009). The adaptation window should at 
least include an implementation sub-window, an insurance sub-window, including 
climate risk pools, and a compensation window for unavoidable damages, such as 
forced migration due to inundation of low-lying islands because of sea-level rise.
3 The windows should be overseen by independent expert panels for mitigation, adap-
tation, technology and capacity building. The current Adaptation Fund should become 
the adaptation window and its board become the adaptation panel. The responsibili-
ties of the panels could include the review of CAPs, LCDS/NAMAs and NAPAs. Based 
on these reviews, the panels would make recommendations to the FMB on where to 
disburse funding. In addition, based on these plans and their assessments of fi nancial 
and technology needs, the expert panels would give recommendations to the FMB on 
the size of funding needed, based on which the FMB would in turn make its recom-
mendation to the COP. 
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3 The mitigation panel would also make calculations of the total emission reductions 
achieved in developing countries through support from industrialised countries and 
report annually to the COP. On this basis, the COP would then review the situation 
of MRV-supported mitigation in developing countries and request further action if 
needed. Similarly, the adaptation panel would assess the progress of the implementa-
tion of NAPAs and on risk prevention measures.
3 The mechanism would be serviced by the UNFCCC secretariat and one or more 
trustee(s) selected through an open bidding process. The trustee would disburse 
funding on the instruction from the FMB.
 
Resource Disbursement
The post-2012 negotiations are now seeing a range of complex proposals on how to 
determine costs and what level of support developing countries would require to imple-
ment NAMAs. However, such an approach would threaten to replicate and exacerbate the 
substantial problems the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) has encountered with imple-
mentation of the incremental cost principle and the problems the CDM has encountered 
with the determination of “additionality”. 
In fact, since NAMAs would probably include policies and programmes, the problems would 
likely be even greater than encountered at the project level by the GEF and the CDM:
3 How to prove that an action is not part of the baseline? Would this even be possible 
given that policies are usually introduced for a variety of reasons and that GHG emis-
sion reduction actions usually entail a number of benefi ts, such as reduction of pollut-
ant emissions, technology promotion, creation of wealth and employment, decreased 
dependence on fossil fuel imports etc.? 
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3 Establishment of baselines is in any case fraught with high uncertainties since it is by 
defi nition counter-factual. In the past, projections have often proven to be too high 
or too low. The German feed-in tariff  is a positive example of an instrument that con-
stantly outperforms expectations. Schneider and Cames (2009) have recently laid out 
in detail the many diffi  culties connected to establishing robust sectoral baselines. 
3 Appropriate or reliable data is often missing.
3 Cost calculations very much depend on what economic conventions are used and are 
prone to manipulation. Tying support to proofs of incremental costs or additionality 
generates a strong perverse incentive to calculate costs as high as possible. 
3 Furthermore, it may in many cases be impossible to establish a direct link between 
an action and the climate benefi t achieved. This applies especially to policies, since 
policies typically intervene in complex environments where many factors come into 
play. If a government, for example, introduces vehicle fuel effi  ciency standards and 
consequently a drop in transport emissions is measured, it would be necessary to dif-
ferentiate to what extent this drop has been a result of the government policy and to 
what extent it has been due to other factors such as rising fuel prices.
Based on the many diffi  culties the GEF has encountered in application of the incremental 
cost principle, it has in fact recently moved away from calculating incremental costs to 
instead narratively explaining the increment. 
As a result of these considerations, we recommend that fi nancial support should not be 
based on a detailed assessment of the additionality of NAMAs and the incrementality of 
their costs. Doing so would require establishment of a substantial assessment bureaucracy 
to examine projected emissions reductions and costs for each NAMA or LCDS. Moreover, 
such an approach would incentivise Southern countries to calculate their baselines and 
mitigation costs as high as possible.
Similarly, for adaptation actions, it is also often diffi  cult to identify which part of an invest-
ment or activity is “additional” adaptation and which is development, in particular in poor 
countries lacking investments in basic infrastructure. Here identifying incremental costs 
is absurd as it would basically translate into identifying the additional cost of climate-
proofi ng an investment that does not exist (cf. Parry et al. 2009). 
Where possible, funding should therefore be provided on a country basis to support com-
prehensive mitigation and adaptation programmes, rather than trying to track money 
fl owing to individual projects. That is, the fi nancial support should take the form of over-
all payments to cover administrative costs of registered NAMAs and NAPAs or National 
Adaptation Strategies and payouts that are part of them, such as feed-in tariff s or fi nancial 
support for energy effi  ciency measures for mitigation or drought preparedness for adap-
tation.
To implement this principle, one or more national climate funds (for example separate 
funds for adaptation and mitigation, though integration may be preferrable where pos-
sible to promote climate-resilient development) could be established in each country 
and accredited by the Financial Mechanism Board. These funds could be based in already 
existing national  development banks or investment authorities and should be supervised 
by the high-level cross-ministerial and multi-stakeholder groups that have been proposed 
above for the development of NAMAs/LCDS and NAPAs. Once accredited by the FMB, 
these funds would then be eligible to receive the funding from the trustee of the global 
climate fund and disburse it as foreseen in the NAMAs/LCDS and NAPAs. The standards for 
accreditation can build on the work that is currently done under the Adaptation Fund to 
enable direct access.
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By contrast, the technology window would focus on supporting specifi c international 
activities for co-operative research and development, deployment and diff usion under a 
new Technology Cooperation Mechanism (see section 8).
Southern countries would have to account for the use they have made of the funding and 
the results they have achieved within the MRV framework (see section 9). If a country’s use 
of the funds is deemed to not have been satisfactory, the FMB should enter into a dialogue 
with the respective country to identify ways to remedy the problems. If this process does 
not lead to a satisfactory solution, future funding would be suspended until the imple-
mentation defi cits have been addressed.
An Evolutionary Approach
Clearly, setting up these institutions at the national and international level could be a very 
lengthy process. However, time is the very thing the international community does not 
have if the 2°C target is still to be met. In addition, industrialised countries are as a mat-
ter of principle currently very reluctant to provide funding that is not under their direct 
control.
To accommodate these practical problems and divergent political positions, an evolution-
ary approach could be taken following option 7 outlined above. A strong fund could be 
created under the UNFCCC, which could as a minimum receive the resources fl owing from 
international aviation and maritime transport. Depending on the design of the regime for 
aviation and maritime transport, these resources could amount to several dozen billion 
USD per year, which would guarantee a strong basis to start from. For the time being, the 
resources that fl ow directly from industrialised country governments could remain under 
their control or be channelled through existing multilateral institutions like the regional 
development banks. The global climate fund, however, should coordinate the resource 
fl ows.
The global climate fund should also develop criteria for accreditation of national climate 
funds within the recipient countries. Countries whose national funds meet these criteria 
would become eligible to receive 100% of their fi nancing needs as agreed with the FMB 
through the global climate fund. As more and more countries meet these eligibility crite-
ria, the required resources would start to exceed those available from aviation and ship-
ping and industrialised countries would hence be more and more required to channel 
their resources through the global fund. At the same time, developing countries would 
have an incentive to create and maintain robust national institutions in order to become 
eligible for funding through the global fund, instead of having to “shop for donors”.
In this way, the system under the UNFCCC as well as trust between industrialised and 
developing countries could be built up step-by-step, and a competition for best solutions 
could be engendered. To accommodate the demands of developing countries, the new 
global climate fund should start at a size suffi  cient to actually make a diff erence. At the 
same time, to accommodate the preferences of industrialised countries, it could at fi rst 
work in parallel to further bilateral and multilateral channels outside the UNFCCC and 
would need to prove that it can indeed perform better. In turn, if a strong fund is created 
under the UNFCCC, the channels outside the UNFCCC would be similarly pressed to show 
that they can perform better, as is being argued by industrialised countries.
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8 International Technology Cooperation
The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall provide 
new and additional fi nancial resources … including for the transfer of technology, needed 
by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing 
measures …  (Art. 4.3 UNFCCC).
Key Components of a Technology Framework
Technology has become a a key issue for the success of the negotiations. While the 
Convention already commits industrialised countries to facilitate technology transfer to 
developing countries, developing countries posit that this commitment has so far hardly 
been turned into action. They therefore demand the creation of a dedicated technol-
ogy cooperation infrastructure as one key precondition for coming to an agreement in 
Copenhagen (Watanabe et al. 2008).
Combating climate change will indeed hardly be possible without the rapid diff usion of 
mitigation and adaptation technologies. However, as mentioned in section 2, the neces-
sary drastic reductions will hardly be possible if technological changes are not accom-
panied by more fundamental changes in the patterns of production and consumption. 
While the following explores how technological change could be accelerated on the basis 
of the Bali Action Plan, it should therefore be kept in mind that technological change 
alone will not be suffi  cient and non-technological changes should therefore form a key 
part of national mitigation actions, in particular in industrialised countries.
Technology cooperation is here understood to address all stages of the innovation cycle. 
The transfer of technologies involves more than hardware supply (Bazilian et al. 2008). 
It encompasses the complex process of sharing knowledge and adapting technology to 
meeting local conditions. Domestic technical and managerial capacities, institutions and 
investments in technological learning all infl uence the eff ectiveness with which technolo-
gies can be absorbed, adapted and reproduced. 
As is the case for the current fi nancial mechanism, the existing technology mechanisms 
under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol have signifi cant defi cits. The funding for the 
transfer of climate technologies is very limited and concentrates on the deployment and 
diff usion stages of the innovation cycle. The provided support covers only half of the tech-
nologies developing countries identifi ed in their Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs). 
Some sectors that have been given much attention in the TNAs, such as buildings, transport 
and agriculture, are largely absent in the projects of the GEF and the CDM (EGTT 2009).
Besides, cap-and-trade systems at best indirectly promote RD&D, nor do the UNFCCC 
technology framework or the GEF support RD&D. As a result, programmatic approaches 
on RD&D with strategic importance are lacking.
A common criticism by developing countries refers to the fact that while UNFCCC agree-
ments contain many references to technology transfer to developing countries, the focus 
of implementation has generally been on creating enabling environments, i.e. condi-
tions conducive to foreign investment, as well as building capacities to absorb and uti-
lize imported technologies (UN DESA 2008). Less emphasis has been placed on measures 
that governments of technology supplier countries could and should take to facilitate and 
accelerate technology transfer.
8 Inter ational Technology Cooperation
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The challenge is to stimulate the development of hundreds of mitigation and adaptation 
technologies that are at diff erent stages of technological development and that have their 
own needs for further development. These technologies need to be adapted and trans-
ferred to about 150 countries, also with own needs for their specifi c country conditions in 
terms of policies, markets, regulatory conditions, people and institutions.
Acknowledging the dramatically diff erent national and regional capabilities, markets, and 
resource-bases that exist, an answer to the challenge is to bring forward technologies that 
are of strategic importance for mitigating and adapting to climate change. We propose 
the following elements for a successful technology cooperation and promotion of sus-
tainable and climate friendly technologies: 
3 A Technology Objective as outlined in section 2
3 A Technology Cooperation Mechanism that helps implement the objective 
3 A Sustainable Development Condition: Environmentally sound technologies should 
to the highest possible degree contribute to sustainable development by generating 
co-benefi ts in development-related areas like poverty reduction and income genera-
tion.
Technology Cooperation Mechanism
The Technology Cooperation Mechanism should include elements that enable the rapid 
diff usion of existing environmentally sound mitigation and adaptation technologies as 
well as cooperative research, development and demonstration (RD&D) of new or not yet 
fully developed technologies. The mechanism should aim at triggering impulses for the 
enhanced cooperation on technology and knowledge exchange. 
The mechanism should be 
fi nancially supported by a 
funding window for tech-
nology cooperation under 
the global climate fund 
(see section 7). To provide 
programmatic and stra-
tegic focusing, an overall 
Sustainable Mitigation and 
Adaptation Plan (SMAT-
Plan) should be devel-
oped (see fi gure). This plan 
should defi ne framework 
programmes for interna-
tional cooperative action 
on technology diff u-
sion and RD&D. The pro-
grammes are to be devel-
oped based on technology 
needs identifi ed in national 
mitigation and adaptation 
actions (NAMAs/ NAPAs) 
(“bottom-up”) and in tech-
nology road maps (“top-
down”). 
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Strategic Programming: Sustainable Mitigation and Adaptation 
Technology Plan (SMAT-Plan)
The Sustainable Mitigation and Adaptation Technology Plan (SMAT-Plan) should aim at 
strategic programming for a diff usion agenda and for RD&D on climate mitigation and 
adaptation technologies within the UNFCCC, and thus help achieve the overall technol-
ogy objective and the targets agreed on in Copenhagen (see above). Diff usion of mar-
ket-ready technologies in the respective countries would be a central point of national 
mitigation and adaptation plans, and supported through the mitigation and adaptation 
funding windows. However, for a rapid broad diff usion of existing key technologies a 
more comprehensive approach is needed. Thus, in addition to the mostly national NAMAs 
and NAPAs, concerted international activities for the diff usion of existing and near-market 
technologies through technology-oriented cooperation, barrier removal and incentives 
for the private sector should be developed. 
To ensure that the programmes and supported activities will be in line with sustainable 
development conditions, key criteria should be set up under the SMAT-Plan that serve as 
guideline for the selection process of the supported technologies and projects or sup-
ported programmes. 
Assessing Technology Needs: Country Plans and Roadmaps
NAMAs/NAPAs/LCDSs. The listing of national mitigation and adaptation actions or com-
prehensive national strategies should identify the fi nancial and technological assistance 
that is needed in developing countries to implement the measures. These technology 
needs are the “bottom-up” source of information for the Technology Panel to develop 
appropriate Framework Programmes that are in line with countries’ technology needs. 
Technology road maps for diff usion and RD&D.  The Technology Panel should develop 
roadmaps for key technologies that are of strategic relevance for achieving the mitiga-
tion and adaptation targets in developing countries. They serve as a top-down informa-
tion source for the Technology Panel, and should encompass technologies that are in the 
beginning of the innovation chain as well as those that have reached advanced stages. 
According to their stage in the innovation chain, barriers and measures to accelerated 
technology transfer should be identifi ed. The central questions to be dealt with in the 
roadmaps are: What are basic needs for R&D on a global and/or regional scale? What are 
the needs for demonstration projects and needs for diff usion activities in order to foster 
a certain technology? The roadmaps should be regularly updated by the panel and com-
plemented by exchanges of experiences on conferences, and especially with the regional 
technology centres (see below).
The two sources to inform the Technology Panel and help establish strategic programmes 
are therefore: First, country-specifi c technology demand identifi ed in the national plans, 
and second, policy options to overcome technology-specifi c barriers identifi ed in the 
technology roadmaps.
Defining Areas for Support: Translating Needs into Action
Diff usion Framework Programme. The programmes should be prepared by the 
Technology Panel, last for 5 years and be approved by the COP. They should outline a 
clear strategy, and the tools needed to enhance the deployment of certain technologies 
or policies. Basis for the diff usion programmes should be the needs outlined in the LCDSs/
NAMAs/NAPAs and technology roadmaps. Existing agencies and/or the newly established 
Regional Centres (see below) should be entrusted with implementation and/or monitor-
ing of the programmes. 
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Joint diff usion projects should have the following features: In contrast to mitigation actions 
that can be implemented mostly at national level and would be fi nanced through the miti-
gation window of the Financial Mechanism (see section 7), joint technology diff usion pro-
grammes require the active involvement of Northern or other Southern partners in order 
to cooperatively boost technology transfer. Strong involvement of the private sector should 
be sought for. Conditions for participation and eligibility criteria should be simple, and the 
project/programme cycle be as fast as possible. In contrast to mainly unilateral national miti-
gation actions, technology cooperation can also imply region-wide or multi-country support.
Possible programmes or activities as part of a programme could be:
3 Technology-centred programmes: Trans-national programmes for the promotion of 
innovative high-cost climate technologies such as concentrating solar power includ-
ing a public-private technology transfer partnership component. The role of the pri-
vate sector would be to aim at establishing whole value-added chains in developing 
countries, whereas the public sector would facilitate the process of leveraging ven-
ture capital. 
3 A programme on supra-regional/trans-national cooperation on adaptation should 
not be organized by technology per se, but according to activities such as technol-
ogy information transfer, infrastructure and hard technology transfer, capacity build-
ing, coordination and policy. “Soft” technology transfer will probably outweigh “hard” 
technology transfer.
3 Programme on regionally-based property funds: A focused eff ort under the Convention 
could be to boost incentives and raise standards to accelerate low carbon investment 
in the property sector. An interconnected suite of regionally based property funds 
could be established to support entrepreneurs in gaining experience in reducing the 
environmental impacts of existing and new stock.
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3 International Integrated Experts Programme: Companies and institutions in devel-
oping countries are often unable to fi nd the right people for key positions on their 
local job markets. The Expert Programme could link up partner country organisations 
needing qualifi ed employees with highly qualifi ed experts from other countries, thus 
paving the way for know-how transfer to developing countries.
3 Explore opportunities to facilitate “South-South” collaborations: A model could be the 
International Energy Initiative, a “Southern-conceived, Southern-led and Southern-
located South-South-North partnership”.
The COP should guide the establishment of the diff erent technology diff usion pro-
grammes in terms of balance between mitigation and adaptation technologies, and in 
terms of sustainable use of technologies.
Joint RD&D Framework Programme. For the promotion and initiation of new joint 
research cooperation as well as demonstration of existing promising technologies, a 
framework programme on RD&D should be established. The fi ve-year programmes 
should focus on key topics, based on the roadmaps and the identifi ed demand for RD&D 
in the SMAT-Plan. They should be proposed by the technology panel and approved by the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientifi c and Technological Advice (SBSTA). Support should be given to 
joint R&D projects and demonstration projects: 
Joint R&D project conditions and options:
3 A precondition for receiving support should be to establish multinational consortia, 
including “South and North” partners or “South and South” partners in a balanced 
way.
3 Various stakeholders can qualify as partners: Not only research institutions can apply. 
Additionally, the engagement of the private sector and other international or civil 
society organizations should be facilitated.
3 Project partners should also be able to apply for regional programmes that address 
specifi c regional research demand, e.g. for adaptation of existing technologies to 
regional or local conditions.
Demonstration projects: 
3 They should encompass large-scale demonstration for key technologies (in DCs/
LDCs).
3 They should not only concentrate on regions with high demand and appropriate con-
ditions, but also on regions that have not benefi ted from demonstration activities 
under the UNFCCC so far.
The R&D and demonstration projects should be attached to the Regional Centres that are 
responsible for the monitoring and evaluation (or regional coordination). 
Institutional Requirements
The implementation of the Technology Cooperation Mechanism requires appropriate 
institutions. In addition to a Technology Panel, existing institutions can be hosts of the 
regional centres and existing international agencies can be entrusted with the implemen-
tation of diff usion programmes.   
Technology Panel. A technology panel or board should be created under the UNFCCC 
to provide high-level strategic advice and to allocate fi nancial resources under the guid-
ance of the COP. As strategic coordination of all technology-related activities under the 
UNFCCC has been missing so far, the technology panel should ensure that knowledge is 
45
 To w a r d s  a n  E f f e c t i v e  a n d  E q u i t a b l e  C l i m a t e  C h a n g e  A g r e e m e n t  WUPPERTAL INSTITUTE
pooled and programmes that are responsive to country needs will be set up. The technol-
ogy panel works in close collaboration with the regional centres.
The UNFCCC Technology Panel should consist of key stakeholders and technology experts 
from diff erent countries with a balanced participation of Annex I and Non-Annex I coun-
tries. The panel members should come from the scientifi c community, civil society organi-
sations, the private sector as well as other international organizations. There should be a 
permanent and limited core staff  that could be hosted by and be part of the Secretariat of 
the Convention. The Panel could fulfi l the following tasks: 
3 Generate technology roadmaps and identify demand for cooperation on disseminat-
ing technologies.
3 Generate technology roadmaps and identify demand for RD&D. 
3 Recommend key topics for the framework programmes to be approved by the COP.
3 Monitor global progress of the roadmaps.
3 Provide support on technology related issues for the development of NAMAs/NAPAs/
LCDSs under the guidance of the COP. 
Regional Centres. Regional technology centres should be established to do targeted 
research for regional requirements and act as regional centres of excellence to spread best 
practice. They should provide recommendations on diff usion activities as well as for R&D 
and for demonstration to the Technology Panel, and exchange experiences on regional 
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conferences. The regional centres could be based in existing independent research insti-
tutes, universities or newly created collaborating centres linked to existing research insti-
tutes and universities.  
Proposed focus of their activities could be the following tasks:
3 Needs assessments for regional RD&D, for joint R&D cooperation and knowledge 
transfer.
3 Regional coordination of R&D on region-specifi c technologies (based on demand for 
adjustment of existing technologies and identifi cation of new technology demand). 
3 Regional coordination of RD&D on adaptation.
3 Fostering regional topical competence networks (bringing together research experts 
and related stakeholders for long-term cooperation). 
3 Acting as reference institution for Joint R&D and demonstration projects. 
3 Monitoring and supervision of implemented projects under the RD&D framework 
programme.
3 Acting as information pool and dissemination point for established low-carbon tech-
nologies, appropriate for the regional conditions.
International Agencies. International agencies should implement the diff usion projects 
and activities according to their respective core competencies. Especially the recently 
launched International Renewable Energy Agency, IRENA, could play a major role in the 
coordination of the international diff usion projects for renewable energy technologies. In 
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parallel the establishment of an International Agency on Energy and Resource Effi  ciency 
would be helpful to disseminate low-demand technology options. Further important 
implementing agencies could be international organizations such as UNDP, UNEP, FAO, 
UNIDO etc., as well as the regional development banks.
Intellectual Property Rights
Finally, a failure to tackle the issue of IPRs constructively will limit the pace of innova-
tion and diff usion and potentially poison the international climate negotiations. A con-
structive approach would be a “protect and share” agreement involving government-to-
government commitments for IPRs and licensing of climate technology (Thomlinson et 
al. 2008). This agreement could include the use of existing fl exibilities, which exist in the 
World Trade Organisation’s agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights and current national laws. This could include measures such as segmented/parallel 
markets (whereby IPR protection is enforced in some markets and provided freely in oth-
ers), public sector purchasing of IPR and advance purchase commitments (such as under 
the Global Fund for HIV/Malaria and TB), compulsory licensing, pay to licence systems, and 
the use of Global Commons.
Questions related to intellectual property rights for a certain technology should be tack-
led within the respective Technology Diff usion Programme. The Technology Panel would 
be in charge of deciding which way best to choose in order to overcome barriers result-
ing from technology patents. In some cases mechanisms such as patent pools or libraries 
could be a solution to the IPR-related problem. In other cases the best way forward could 
be to fi nance the incremental costs resulting from licensing. Assigning the evaluation of 
IPR-related barriers to the Technology Panel makes sure that case-by-case decisions are 
taken according to the relevant technology and country. 
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9 Measuring, Reporting and Verification
The Bali Action Plan placed measuring, reporting and verifi cation at the heart of the 
Copenhagen deal: Industrialised countries are to commit to and achieve absolute 
emissions caps, in particular the USA which has so far not ratifi ed the Kyoto Protocol. 
Developing countries are to implement NAMAs and industrialised countries are to pro-
vide fi nancial and technological support, and all of these are to happen in a measurable, 
reportable and verifi able manner. However, provisions for MRV need to be designed 
light so as not to block the speedy implementation of measures. Care should be taken 
to not create a cumbersome MRV bureaucracy that would smother the implementation 
of measures in red tape.
The rigour of the current MRV regime varies widely between Annex I and non-Annex I 
and between diff erent aspects. As for their emissions, industrialised countries are required 
to submit annual inventories according to IPCC methodologies and reporting guidelines 
adoped by the Parties. These inventories are reviewed annually by independent expert 
teams, with in-country reviews taking place at least every fi ve years. Given the intense 
focus put into improving the inventories over several years, they are nowadays fairly reli-
able. By contrast, while industrialised countries are also required to report on their poli-
cies and measures and their impacts as well as on the fi nancial and technological support 
they provide to developing countries, so far no specifi c standards and metrics have been 
agreed and the quality of reporting diff ers widely.
Non-Annex I inventories are prepared using less rigorous standards, are submitted less 
frequently and not subject to an international review. Most developing countries have 
serious capacity constraints. While they are entitled to full cost coverage in the prepara-
tion of their inventories, this support is project-based for each individual submission. It is 
therefore episodic, which makes it diffi  cult to maintain inventory capacity on a continu-
ous basis. The reporting guidelines for policies and measures in developing countries are 
also less rigourous than for industrialised countries and the quality of reporting varies 
widely (Breideneich and Bodansky 2009).
Requirements for industrialised countries should therefore be strengthened in two 
regards. First, common metrics and standards should be defi ned for the reporting of the 
impact of policies and measures. Second, to satisfy the Bali Action Plan the provision of 
fi nancial and technological support will need to be made MRVable. Industrialised coun-
tries should therefore commit to reporting the following
3 The amount of fi nances delivered to the fi nancial mechanism and other bilateral and 
multilateral initiatives if applicable.
3 Information on and the fi nancial amount of other technology cooperation activities.
3 Information to demonstrate that all resources provided were new and additional.
The COP would need to develop performance indicators for these items, in particular for 
the demonstration that delivered resources were new and additional (which will be rela-
tively easy, if fi nancial resources are generated from selling AAUs). The system for moni-
toring fl ows of offi  cial development assistance under the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee may off er some lessons in this regard.
As for developing countries, what is emerging in the negotiations is a framework for highly 
diversifi ed actions, based on countries’ diff ering national circumstances. While some more 
advanced developing countries may adopt actions like sectoral no-lose targets, for the 
9 Measuring, Reporting a d Verification
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most part developing country actions will not be target-based but consist of specifi c poli-
cies and measures. This makes MRV far more challenging.
As discussed in section 7, attempting to measure the emission impacts of a specifi c action 
is not at all straightforward. While it will be necessary to get a clear picture of both the 
implementation of NAMAs and the development of emissions in developing countries, 
we propose to separate MRV of the two.
To avoid establishing a massive review mechanism that would require substantial resources 
to assess the emission impacts of NAMAs and would nevertheless only yield approximate 
results, NAMAs should mainly be MRVed not as regards their emission impact but as 
regards their implementation. That is, the emission impact should be monitored to the 
extent possible and reported, but without an extensive verifi cation and without attempt-
ing to make it as exact as possible. The level of monitoring and reporting would have to 
be defi ned in the framework of the Financial Mechanism, where developing countries 
would have to account for the use they have made of the funding and the results they 
have achieved (see section 7). However, for the general framework of implementation of 
the Copenhagen agreement, mainly the robustness of implementation should be MRVed. 
The Conference of the Parties should develop guidelines for what constitutes a robust 
NAMA, such as setting goals, implementing related actions, ensuring suffi  cient human and 
fi nancial resources for these actions, documentation requirements and tracking progress 
over time. One possible approach has been proposed by the United Nations Foundation. 
According to this proposal the COP could request the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) to develop a management system standard for NAMAs. Developing 
countries could then develop a comprehensive climate management system according 
to this standard and request international certifi cation. NAMAs that are developed within 
a successfully certifi ed national management system would be automatically deemed to 
be MRVable. This approach would mirror the relationship the COP has with the IPCC as 
regards the development of emission inventory requirements (Kimble and Niederberger 
2009).
How successful developing countries are in reducing their emissions should be assessed 
at the aggregate level through much more robust and frequent emission inventories and 
an international review process. All non-Annex I countries except LDCs and SIDS should 
commit to preparing robust emission inventories as early as possible and by 2013 at the 
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latest, with at least biannual updates thereafter. Requirements for newly industrialised 
countries that assume a binding national target should be the same as for Annex I coun-
tries. Requirements for countries that do not assume a target would not need to be as strict, 
but inventories should nevertheless follow the IPCC good practice guidance, include a full 
time-series of emissions data and document the methodologies and assumptions used. 
One proposal that is currently on the table is to integrate the international reporting 
and verifi cation of NAMAs and support obligations into the national communications. 
However, much of the information contained in national communications is not needed 
for the MRV requirements of the Bali Action Plan and more frequent submission would 
be very burdensome for countries, especially developing countries. Instead, more narrow 
NAMA and CAP implementation reports could be submitted regularly, for example bian-
nually. They could be modelled on the policies and measures chapter currently required 
for Annex I national communications (Breideneich and Bodansky 2009). However, they 
would need more detailed requirements, for example through a management system 
standard approach as outlined above.
The reports as well as the emission inventories should be internationally reviewed by inde-
pendent experts under the FMB, though resource-intensive in-country reviews might not 
be necessary for countries that do not assume a target. As a further layer of verifi cation, 
the national multi-stakeholder groups proposed above for the development of NAMAs/
LCDS and NAPAs could monitor implementation of the plans and actions and report to 
the FCCC, in parallel to the reporting by governments (Aprodev 2009).
Industrialised countries should commit to covering the full costs related to monitoring, 
reporting and verifi cation of NAMAs and to deliver the necessary capacity building to 
enable developing countries to meet the related requirements. 
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10 Revisit and Improve
Both the speed of climate change and of climate science have recently increased signif-
icantly. As noted above, the fi ndings in the IPCC’s fourth assessment report were  sig-
nifi cantly more alarming than in the third. In addition, several scientists held that AR4 
was already outdated when it was published and this impression has been confi rmed 
by recent publications (Richardson et al. 2009). International climate policy, including a 
Copenhagen Agreement, therefore needs to be designed so as to be able to react most 
fl exibly to new and reliable scientifi c evidence.
Therefore, the current fi ve-year length of commitment periods should not be extended. 
Lengthening commitment periods could lock the world into a long-term trajectory 
that might later emerge to not be compatible with preventing dangerous climate 
change. Moreover, fi ve years is compatible with the time horizon of most policy-makers. 
Commitments that are due longer into the future are quickly seen as somebody else’s 
problem, as was demonstrated in the run up to the fi rst commitment period. Most coun-
tries only started to signifi cantly strengthen their climate policies when the start of the 
commitment period was imminent. As a result, most non-EIT countries will probably have 
to heavily rely on the fl exible mechanisms if they are to meet their targets at all. Based on 
these considerations it might even be preferrable to move to annual or biannual commit-
ment periods.
If fi ve-year periods are retained, the negotiations for the third commitment period 2018-
2022 should start in 2013 at the latest. In addition, there should be a review clause com-
bined with a full-scale evaluation of the environmental eff ectiveness of the Copenhagen 
agreement. This has become a standard feature of international environmental agree-
ments and has also been used by the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. However, the record 
for compliance with review clauses is not perfect and the provision should thus be for-
mulated with stricter legal quality. At the latest, the fi rst such review of the Copenhagen 
agreement should be conducted in 2014/15, after the release of the fi fth IPCC assessment 
report as currently scheduled, and inform the negotiations for the third commitment 
period.
To make sure this review actually takes place and that the negotiations on the third com-
mitment period are conclued in time, the Copenhagen agreement should additionally 
include a default emission reduction obligation for industrialised countries: In case nego-
tiations on future targets are delayed or unsuccessful, the Copenhagen agreement should 
defi ne a linear trajectory reducing each industrialised countries’ emissions by 95% below 
1990 levels by 2050.
52
WUPPERTAL INSTITUTE  To w a r d s  a n  E f f e c t i v e  a n d  E q u i t a b l e  C l i m a t e  C h a n g e  A g r e e m e n t
11  Not at Any Cost: 
No Agreement May Be Better 
than a Weak Agreement
The consequences of Parties not coming to a new agreement are uncertain. Not agreeing 
on emission reduction targets and fi nancing for developing countries would mean that 
a common eff ort to stop climate change had failed. However, failure of a common eff ort 
would not necessarily mean that there would be no further eff ort at all. The analysis of 
the IPCC that man-made climate change is accelerating would still be true and commu-
nicated by researchers, civil society organisations and the media. The concern about the 
future of the planet would still be a hot political topic, maybe even more directly linked 
to government action than in the current situation. Due to tactical reasons in waiting for 
the outcome of the negotiations, governments might currently even be slowing down 
action and commitment. Finally, it is not an agreement that saves the world, but practical 
action to reduce GHG emissions: Policies, measures, innovations, diff usion of technolo-
gies etc. The question is which modus of governance delivers the best results in respect 
to action. Is it a global deal possibly including many compromises? Or could action also 
be stimulated by other mechanisms? Research on the international diff usion of policies 
(e.g. Tews et al. 2003) and research on federal states show that other coordinating mech-
anisms do exist. 
International arrangements like the European Union that are based on consensus can get 
stuck in the joint decision trap (Scharpf 1985), i.e. the impossibility of any progress due 
to the veto positions of individual states. However, harmonisation of policies can also be 
based on competition between nation states, as the research community, civil society, 
political parties and media continually observe activities in other countries and innovative 
approaches from there are thus inserted into national discussions. A good example is the 
German law on feed-in tariff s for renewable energy that is nowadays recognized globally. 
Such competition for the best solution can lead to a ‘race to the top’ and subsequently 
be stronger than agreements between governments. Another example for a ‘race to the 
top’ is the emission standard for cars (pollutants) in California that spread all over the USA 
(Scharpf 1997). 
The reports by the IPCC already give a framework of reference to national emission reduc-
tion action: The problem is described. All governments have to justify their eff orts against 
the scientifi c evidence of reduction needs. While small countries can demonstrate their 
innovative capacity and act quicker, large countries with a signifi cant share of GHG emis-
sions are under high international pressure to contribute to the solution. If these coun-
tries take action, lead markets for innovative technologies and solutions will develop and 
stimulate diff usion without formalized coordination. Such processes could even work for 
fi nancing of activities in developing countries. 
Whether such a ‘race to the top’ processes would really take place if no deal was reached 
internationally is quite open. However, if there is no ambitious deal, a weak agreement 
could even be a barrier to start competition between nation states. The pressure to act 
would be lifted off  governments, as they could refer to the internationally “accepted” tar-
gets that would be more or less equal to a BAU scenario, and these might replace the 
reduction needs described by the IPCC as benchmarks. 
11  Not at Any Cost: 
No Agreem nt May Be Better 
than a We k Agreem nt
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Therefore, governments should take all possible eff orts to come to a strong agreement at 
Copenhagen. This will in any case be better than a weak agreement, or no agreement at 
all. And it will be the only way commensurate with the challenges of climate change that 
are lying ahead of us.
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